There were a trio of interesting articles on CSM today. First, this story on the marked decline of class mobility in America. A troubling trend that underscores, again, the danger in relying on capitalism to deliver social justice. There tends to be an implicit assumption that in a free market everyone gets what they deserve. If there are structural barriers to class mobility, that assumption becomes less valid.
The next story, a happy one for a change, discusses various much-needed efforts at reforming the jury system. As the article notes, there is a great deal of variation among the states (and some are doing nothing at all). Hopefully some of these programs will prove successful and spread to other states.
The story I most wanted to comment on, however, discusses the frightening perceptions among Arabs of our treatment of prisoners in the war on terror. The story focuses on recently leaked pictures of Saddam in his underwear. It also comments on the Newsweek Koran flushing story and the recent NYT story on abusive treatment leading to the deaths of two prisoners, as well as the light sentences and lack of high level accountability for Abu Ghraib. While the Newsweek retraction provided a high profile opportunity for the scoring of political points, I hope that we haven't lost sight of the very real problem that our cavalier treatment of prisoners is creating. These are not isolated incidents. University of Miami law professor Michael Froomkin has been keeping a watch for torture stories on his blog. A sampling:
- U.S. takes hostages to coerce relatives into surrendering
- Guantanamo prisoner claims to have suffered violent sexual assaults and near drowning during his captivity.
- Guantanamo prisoner claims that Gitmo tapes would be as explosive as the Abu Ghraib photos
- Guantanamo prisoner claims innocence, details physical mistreatment
- Guantanamo prisoner claims prisoners were handcuffed naked and attacked by dogs
- 15-year-old Guantanamo detainee claims abuse
- Pentagon inquiry confirms use of sexual tactics in interrogations
- Military lawyers at Gitmo try and fail to end physical abuse of prisoners.
- Afghan prisoner, left exposed to the elements by the CIA freezes to death.
- Gitmo prisoner claims torture, assault, near-suffocation
- Mother Jones story details many claims of torture at hands of U.S.
- Navy disgusted by abusive treatment at Gitmo.
- Terror prisoners claim to have been beaten and abused at New York's Metropolitan Detention Center.
- Iraqi prisoner hung from the wrists until dead (Abu Ghraib related)
These are stories that may not get much play in the U.S., and to be fair, many of them are unconfirmed allegations. However, they almost certainly draw attention from Al-Jazeera and other Arab outlets. As the CSM story notes, U.S. treatment of prisoners is having a strong impact on Arab public opinion. It is difficult to believe that high level decisions (such as the DoD memos exposed after Abu Ghraib) within the administration are not fostering such treatment. Unless I've been grossly misinformed, these sorts of actions do not typify American treatment of prisoners in past conflicts. Moreover, it is difficult to see what we gain from all of this. There have been few claims that we've gained critical intel from this abuse, and many claims to the contrary. I simply don't understand why we aren't doing anything about this. Abu Ghraib never got any real reaction within the administration or the DoD, and all of these stories roll by without attracting any significant attention. Aside from the fact that this treatment is shameful in view of Americans' generally shared values of human rights and human dignity, it seems ruinous from a strategic PR standpoint. But no one in the administration, and few in the press, are paying attention. Whatever stupid things Newsweek may have done, that's the real story here.
Showing posts with label Abu Ghraib. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abu Ghraib. Show all posts
Monday, May 23, 2005
Friday, January 21, 2005
Leadership By Default
I was rather struck by this Washington Post column by Robert Bork and David Rivkin arguing that the court should stop managing the War on Terror. On the one hand, their arguments are entirely plausible. The Hamdi case serves as a perfect example. The court knew that something needed to be done, but they could hardly create a detailed policy directive as to how to treat enemy combatants. So they issued some vague requirements and left the government to figure out what the court was after through trial and error. It is hardly an ideal solution.
On the other hand, for the court to take a hands-off approach as Bork and Rivkin suggest would be even more absurd. The problem here is that Congress apparently doesn't give a crap about the War on Terror, and if the executive has an actual plan, they refuse to say a word as to what they are doing or why. The courts shouldn't be in a leadership position on this, but they have no choice. Nobody else will do it.
If the Administration would explain what exactly it is they're doing, their rationale, what sort of limits they place on themselves, and how they're enforcing those limits, then the courts would have a sound basis to grant them broad discretion. However, we have none of that, and instead have Abu Ghraib, a proposal for a jurisdiction-free-zone in Cuba, documents suggesting that the Geneva Conventions are quaint and torture is ok. How could the courts not intervene?
Bork and Rivkin attempt to write off these various indiscretions as abuses that "inevitably occur in war". I don't buy it. This morning I attended a presentation by reporter Donovan Webster, who recently wrote an article for Vanity Fair called "The Man In the Hood" (the article is not online, but there's a brief summary here, and an Aljazeera article about it here). Webster visited Iraq twice last fall and conducted 60 hours of interviews with former Iraqi detainees, visited detention sites, and spoke with the military personnel there. Webster contends (fairly convincingly) that the abuses famously exposed at Abu Ghraib were widespread, and continue to this day, and that no serious changes resulted from the initial round of publicity. This is an administration in desperate need of adult supervision, and it would be a horrific abdication for the courts to back down.
On the other hand, for the court to take a hands-off approach as Bork and Rivkin suggest would be even more absurd. The problem here is that Congress apparently doesn't give a crap about the War on Terror, and if the executive has an actual plan, they refuse to say a word as to what they are doing or why. The courts shouldn't be in a leadership position on this, but they have no choice. Nobody else will do it.
If the Administration would explain what exactly it is they're doing, their rationale, what sort of limits they place on themselves, and how they're enforcing those limits, then the courts would have a sound basis to grant them broad discretion. However, we have none of that, and instead have Abu Ghraib, a proposal for a jurisdiction-free-zone in Cuba, documents suggesting that the Geneva Conventions are quaint and torture is ok. How could the courts not intervene?
Bork and Rivkin attempt to write off these various indiscretions as abuses that "inevitably occur in war". I don't buy it. This morning I attended a presentation by reporter Donovan Webster, who recently wrote an article for Vanity Fair called "The Man In the Hood" (the article is not online, but there's a brief summary here, and an Aljazeera article about it here). Webster visited Iraq twice last fall and conducted 60 hours of interviews with former Iraqi detainees, visited detention sites, and spoke with the military personnel there. Webster contends (fairly convincingly) that the abuses famously exposed at Abu Ghraib were widespread, and continue to this day, and that no serious changes resulted from the initial round of publicity. This is an administration in desperate need of adult supervision, and it would be a horrific abdication for the courts to back down.
Tuesday, October 26, 2004
Not Learning the Lesson
Apparently, back in March, even as the Abu Ghraib story was breaking, and even as the administration was trying to distance itself from the Justice Department's prior statements that international laws on torture didn't apply to the US, the Office of Legal Counsel was hard at work releasing an opinion stating that the CIA could remove prisoners from Iraq in contravention of the Geneva Convention, even as they acknowledge that this action constitutes a grave breach and a war crime under the terms of the convention. The Post article cites international law experts as calling the reasoning in the memo "unconventional and disturbing". These guys just don't take a hint...
Saturday, June 12, 2004
And Sanchez is the Winner! (or the Loser, All Depending How You Look At It)
The WP opens this story with the following:
Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior U.S. military officer in Iraq, borrowed heavily from a list of high-pressure interrogation tactics used at the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and approved letting senior officials at a Baghdad jail use military dogs, temperature extremes, reversed sleep patterns, sensory deprivation, and diets of bread and water on detainees whenever they wished, according to newly obtained documents.
I'm sure that the Pentagon's decision to "rotate out" General Sanchez (LAT) had nothing to do with this. President Bush: Sanchez "has done a fabulous job. He's been there for a long time. His service has been exemplary."
A "Senior Defense Official" said "He's been there going on 14 months now. Anybody trying to draw a line between the natural progression of looking for somebody to rotate into that position to the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib would be just wrong. There's absolutely no connection whatever."
From the LAT story: "It was unknown what Sanchez's next assignment would be."
Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior U.S. military officer in Iraq, borrowed heavily from a list of high-pressure interrogation tactics used at the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and approved letting senior officials at a Baghdad jail use military dogs, temperature extremes, reversed sleep patterns, sensory deprivation, and diets of bread and water on detainees whenever they wished, according to newly obtained documents.
I'm sure that the Pentagon's decision to "rotate out" General Sanchez (LAT) had nothing to do with this. President Bush: Sanchez "has done a fabulous job. He's been there for a long time. His service has been exemplary."
A "Senior Defense Official" said "He's been there going on 14 months now. Anybody trying to draw a line between the natural progression of looking for somebody to rotate into that position to the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib would be just wrong. There's absolutely no connection whatever."
From the LAT story: "It was unknown what Sanchez's next assignment would be."
Friday, June 11, 2004
Sanchez or Pappas or Miller in the Doghouse?
From the Senate Hearing on May 19:
REED: General Sanchez, today's USA Today, sir, reported that you ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation, intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise and inducing fear as an interrogation method for a prisoner in Abu Ghraib prison. Is that correct?
SANCHEZ: Sir, that may be correct that it's in a news article, but I never approved any of those measures to be used within CJTF-7 at any time in the last year.
REED: Excuse me. Because I want to get back to this. It may be correct that you ordered those methods used against a prisoner. Is that your answer?
SANCHEZ: No, sir, that's not what I said. I said it may be correct...
REED: Well, I didn't hear; that's why I want...
SANCHEZ: ... that it's printed in an article, but I have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in the 12.5 months that I've been in Iraq.
From Today's Washington Post:
Sgts. Michael J. Smith and Santos A. Cardona, Army dog handlers assigned to Abu Ghraib, told investigators that military intelligence personnel requested that they bring their dogs to prison interrogation sites multiple times to assist in questioning detainees in December and January. Col. Thomas M. Pappas, who was in charge of military intelligence at the prison, told both soldiers that the use of dogs in interrogations had been approved, according to the statements.
"I have talked to Col. Papus [sic] and he said it was good to go," Smith told an investigator on Jan. 23.
* * *
In Army memos regarding interrogation techniques at the prison, the use of military working dogs was specifically allowed -- as long as higher-ranking officers approved the measures. According to one military intelligence memo obtained by The Post, the officer in charge of the military intelligence-run interrogation center at the prison had to approve the use of dogs in interrogations. There is no explanation in the memo of what parameters would have to be in place -- for example, whether the dogs would be muzzled or unmuzzled -- or what the dogs would be allowed to do. The Army previously has said that the commanding general of U.S. troops in Iraq -- Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez -- would have had to approve the use of dogs.
This all comes out immediately after Lt. Gen. Sanchez asked that a higher-ranking official take over the investigation so that he could be questioned about his role in the prison abuse (see this CNN article)
In an earlier story, the WP quotes Col. Pappas as saying that Gen. Miller did in fact approve the use of dogs (from Taguba's report--apparently Pappas's statement is in the 2,000 pages that the Pentagon failed to deliver to Congress (see this NYT story)--although this Reuters story claims the Army now certifies that the Senate now has a "true and accurate copy of the report")
"It was a technique I had personally discussed with General Miller, when he was here" visiting the prison, testified Pappas, head of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the officer placed in charge of the cellblocks at Abu Ghraib prison where abuses occurred in the wake of Miller's visit to Baghdad between Aug. 30 and Sept. 9, 2003.
"He said that they used military working dogs at Gitmo [the nickname for Guantanamo Bay], and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which, you know, you could get information" from the prisoners, Pappas told the Army investigator, Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, according to a transcript provided to The Washington Post.
* * *
After calling the use of dogs Miller's idea, Pappas explained that "in the execution of interrogation, and the interrogation business in general, we are trying to get info from these people. We have to act in an environment not to permanently damage them, or psychologically abuse them, but we have to assert control and get detainees into a position where they're willing to talk to us."
Pappas added that it "would never be my intent that the dog be allowed to bite or in any way touch a detainee or anybody else." He said he recalled speaking to one dog handler and telling him "they could be used in interrogations" anytime according to terms spelled out in a Sept. 14, 2003, memo signed by Sanchez.
That memo included the use of dogs among techniques that did not require special approval. The policy was changed on Oct. 12 to require Sanchez's approval on a case-by-case basis for certain techniques, including having "military working dogs" present during interrogations.
REED: General Sanchez, today's USA Today, sir, reported that you ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation, intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise and inducing fear as an interrogation method for a prisoner in Abu Ghraib prison. Is that correct?
SANCHEZ: Sir, that may be correct that it's in a news article, but I never approved any of those measures to be used within CJTF-7 at any time in the last year.
REED: Excuse me. Because I want to get back to this. It may be correct that you ordered those methods used against a prisoner. Is that your answer?
SANCHEZ: No, sir, that's not what I said. I said it may be correct...
REED: Well, I didn't hear; that's why I want...
SANCHEZ: ... that it's printed in an article, but I have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in the 12.5 months that I've been in Iraq.
From Today's Washington Post:
Sgts. Michael J. Smith and Santos A. Cardona, Army dog handlers assigned to Abu Ghraib, told investigators that military intelligence personnel requested that they bring their dogs to prison interrogation sites multiple times to assist in questioning detainees in December and January. Col. Thomas M. Pappas, who was in charge of military intelligence at the prison, told both soldiers that the use of dogs in interrogations had been approved, according to the statements.
"I have talked to Col. Papus [sic] and he said it was good to go," Smith told an investigator on Jan. 23.
* * *
In Army memos regarding interrogation techniques at the prison, the use of military working dogs was specifically allowed -- as long as higher-ranking officers approved the measures. According to one military intelligence memo obtained by The Post, the officer in charge of the military intelligence-run interrogation center at the prison had to approve the use of dogs in interrogations. There is no explanation in the memo of what parameters would have to be in place -- for example, whether the dogs would be muzzled or unmuzzled -- or what the dogs would be allowed to do. The Army previously has said that the commanding general of U.S. troops in Iraq -- Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez -- would have had to approve the use of dogs.
This all comes out immediately after Lt. Gen. Sanchez asked that a higher-ranking official take over the investigation so that he could be questioned about his role in the prison abuse (see this CNN article)
In an earlier story, the WP quotes Col. Pappas as saying that Gen. Miller did in fact approve the use of dogs (from Taguba's report--apparently Pappas's statement is in the 2,000 pages that the Pentagon failed to deliver to Congress (see this NYT story)--although this Reuters story claims the Army now certifies that the Senate now has a "true and accurate copy of the report")
"It was a technique I had personally discussed with General Miller, when he was here" visiting the prison, testified Pappas, head of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the officer placed in charge of the cellblocks at Abu Ghraib prison where abuses occurred in the wake of Miller's visit to Baghdad between Aug. 30 and Sept. 9, 2003.
"He said that they used military working dogs at Gitmo [the nickname for Guantanamo Bay], and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which, you know, you could get information" from the prisoners, Pappas told the Army investigator, Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, according to a transcript provided to The Washington Post.
* * *
After calling the use of dogs Miller's idea, Pappas explained that "in the execution of interrogation, and the interrogation business in general, we are trying to get info from these people. We have to act in an environment not to permanently damage them, or psychologically abuse them, but we have to assert control and get detainees into a position where they're willing to talk to us."
Pappas added that it "would never be my intent that the dog be allowed to bite or in any way touch a detainee or anybody else." He said he recalled speaking to one dog handler and telling him "they could be used in interrogations" anytime according to terms spelled out in a Sept. 14, 2003, memo signed by Sanchez.
That memo included the use of dogs among techniques that did not require special approval. The policy was changed on Oct. 12 to require Sanchez's approval on a case-by-case basis for certain techniques, including having "military working dogs" present during interrogations.
Sunday, May 23, 2004
Wait--There's More Bad Apples
The San Diego Union-Tribune reports here:
While world attention was focused on the scandal at Abu Ghraib prison, two Marines were court-martialed May 14 for abusing an Iraqi prisoner with electricity, it was disclosed yesterday.
Five more Marines have been implicated in the same early April incident at a Marine-run detention facility and might face charges, according to Marine officials in Iraq.
Andrew J. Sting and Jeremiah J. Trefney, both 19 and privates first class assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment at Camp Lejeune, N.C., pleaded guilty to charges that included cruelty and maltreatment for shocking an unruly prisoner, according to a Marine statement in response to questions from The San Diego Union-Tribune.
The East Coast-based infantry battalion is attached to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which has headquarters in San Diego.
The prisoner had been detained at Al Mahmudiya prison.
Sting was sentenced to a year in jail and Trefney received eight months. Both were reduced in rank, will forfeit all pay and will leave the military with a bad conduct discharge.
Notice that the last two reports are NOT from Abu Ghraib.
While world attention was focused on the scandal at Abu Ghraib prison, two Marines were court-martialed May 14 for abusing an Iraqi prisoner with electricity, it was disclosed yesterday.
Five more Marines have been implicated in the same early April incident at a Marine-run detention facility and might face charges, according to Marine officials in Iraq.
Andrew J. Sting and Jeremiah J. Trefney, both 19 and privates first class assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment at Camp Lejeune, N.C., pleaded guilty to charges that included cruelty and maltreatment for shocking an unruly prisoner, according to a Marine statement in response to questions from The San Diego Union-Tribune.
The East Coast-based infantry battalion is attached to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which has headquarters in San Diego.
The prisoner had been detained at Al Mahmudiya prison.
Sting was sentenced to a year in jail and Trefney received eight months. Both were reduced in rank, will forfeit all pay and will leave the military with a bad conduct discharge.
Notice that the last two reports are NOT from Abu Ghraib.
Friday, May 21, 2004
The Actions of a Few
I have been thinking some about the Bush administration's response that the whole Abu Ghraib affair should be brushed aside and focus placed on more pressing issues because it is simply "the actions of a few" and does not represent "the true nature and heart of America" according to Bush in his apology to Jordan's King Abdullah [AP](I never did figure out why Bush apologized to Jordan for the prison abuses). And it finally struck me that we are asking the Arab world to measure us not by the actions of those few derelict soldiers (assuming that is an accurate assessment of the situation), but rather by the conduct of all Americans. However, when it comes to the Global War on Terror, the Bush administration and many who support the war continue to condemn and oppress the Arab world based on the actions of a few.
For example, Senator Inhofe expressed "outrage at the outrage" at the Senate Hearing on May 11 (NYT) because the prisoners we are so concerned about are all (in Inhofe's mind) murderers, insurgents, and terrorists. And almost to prove his point, "those people" decapitated Nicholas Berg--one of "us"--that same day.
Contrary to Senator Inhofe's suggestions, the ICRC claims that most of the Abu Ghraib prisoners (up to 90%) are innocent. At the very least, we know that Abu Ghraib prisoners were not "high value"--the "high value" campers got extra-special treatment at a separate facility near the Baghdad Airport (that is now being investigated too [MSNBC]).
My point is that many of the problems that we face now and will continue to face in battling this Global War on Terror stems from separating "us" from "them," and holding "us" to a different standard than "them." How many Fallujans did we kill to avenge the deaths of four civilian contractors? Were they all murderers, insurgents, and terrorists too? Until we are willing to extend the same basic liberties that we consider inalienable for ourselves to all those who share this planet, there will be terrorism. Until we are willing to accept that the actions of a few others do not justify waging war on all others, we cannot hope to persuade the world that the actions of a few of "us" should not reflect poorly upon America.
For example, Senator Inhofe expressed "outrage at the outrage" at the Senate Hearing on May 11 (NYT) because the prisoners we are so concerned about are all (in Inhofe's mind) murderers, insurgents, and terrorists. And almost to prove his point, "those people" decapitated Nicholas Berg--one of "us"--that same day.
Contrary to Senator Inhofe's suggestions, the ICRC claims that most of the Abu Ghraib prisoners (up to 90%) are innocent. At the very least, we know that Abu Ghraib prisoners were not "high value"--the "high value" campers got extra-special treatment at a separate facility near the Baghdad Airport (that is now being investigated too [MSNBC]).
My point is that many of the problems that we face now and will continue to face in battling this Global War on Terror stems from separating "us" from "them," and holding "us" to a different standard than "them." How many Fallujans did we kill to avenge the deaths of four civilian contractors? Were they all murderers, insurgents, and terrorists too? Until we are willing to extend the same basic liberties that we consider inalienable for ourselves to all those who share this planet, there will be terrorism. Until we are willing to accept that the actions of a few others do not justify waging war on all others, we cannot hope to persuade the world that the actions of a few of "us" should not reflect poorly upon America.
Monday, May 10, 2004
Could It Be?
President Bush has scheduled a press conference at 11:30 ET at the Pentagon...
Update: That press conference was worthless. And my prediction was wrong. I am constantly amazed at the depth of this administration's denial. But I am even more amazed that the people have lost all affect. Rape? Torture? Those are just things that happen during wartime, and anyone who thinks otherwise is hopelessly naive. International disgrace? Who cares, so long as things look good at home. Lies? Everyone's a liar. And anyone accusing this administration of doing bad things is obviously making those accusations for political purposes.
No, the Bush administration isn't giving Rumsfeld walking papers. They are giving him accolades. President Bush (according to the AP): Secretary Rumsfeld "is doing a superb job"--he's a strong secretary and the nation owes him a debt of gratitude. Vice President Cheney (according to Reuters): He's the best Secretary of Defense the United States has ever had. People ought to get off Rumsfeld's case and let him do his job.
God bless America.
Update: That press conference was worthless. And my prediction was wrong. I am constantly amazed at the depth of this administration's denial. But I am even more amazed that the people have lost all affect. Rape? Torture? Those are just things that happen during wartime, and anyone who thinks otherwise is hopelessly naive. International disgrace? Who cares, so long as things look good at home. Lies? Everyone's a liar. And anyone accusing this administration of doing bad things is obviously making those accusations for political purposes.
No, the Bush administration isn't giving Rumsfeld walking papers. They are giving him accolades. President Bush (according to the AP): Secretary Rumsfeld "is doing a superb job"--he's a strong secretary and the nation owes him a debt of gratitude. Vice President Cheney (according to Reuters): He's the best Secretary of Defense the United States has ever had. People ought to get off Rumsfeld's case and let him do his job.
God bless America.
Questioning Prisoners of War
Both the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the U.S. Law of Land Warfare have this to say about the questioning of prisoners of war:
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
Section VI, which discusses quarters, food, and clothing, states that POWs "shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health."
I leave it to you to decide whether the Pentagon's approved tactics of "sensory assault" (as described in this WP story) constitute exposure "to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind," and whether the conditions in Abu Ghraib were the same as those provided to U.S. troops in Baghdad.
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
Section VI, which discusses quarters, food, and clothing, states that POWs "shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health."
I leave it to you to decide whether the Pentagon's approved tactics of "sensory assault" (as described in this WP story) constitute exposure "to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind," and whether the conditions in Abu Ghraib were the same as those provided to U.S. troops in Baghdad.
Saturday, May 08, 2004
The Taguba Report and "National Security"
My second concern regarding Rumsfeld's testimony is his explanation about how the investigation of prisoner abuse was handled within the military. As Rumsfeld repeatedly emphasized, the military began an investigation in January, and we now know that Major General Taguba released his report in February. It was classified. Why? When that question was posed to Rumsfeld in a press conference on May 4th, this is what he and General Pace had to say:
Q: General, a quick follow-up on that, please. Could you explain to us why the Taguba report was classified secret, no foreign distribution? Those of us who have read the report, there's clearly nothing in there that's inherently secret, such as intelligence sources and methods or troop movements. Was this kept secret because it would be embarrassing to the world, particularly the Arab world?
GEN. PACE: First of all, I do not know specifically why it was labeled secret. Potentially there are parts of the hundreds and hundreds of pages of documentation that are classified. I do not know that to be a fact, but normally we will classify a document at the highest level of anything that's in that document.
But as the secretary pointed out, immediately we told the world that we thought we had a problem. So there has been no attempt to hide this. What we've been trying to do is find out the truth of the matter so we can get on about correcting; finding out who did what, and then taking a proper action.
Q: Mr. Secretary, can you say why it was classified secret? Do you know?
SEC. RUMSFELD: No, you'd have to ask the classifier.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: Mr. Secretary? Taking into account –
SEC. RUMSFELD: You can ask General Casey, who's going to be down here discussing that later.
I don't know whether General Casey indeed discussed that later. As far as I have been able to find, there has been no explanation for why the Taguba report was classified.
On March 25, 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order 13292 that sets forth the policies and procedures for classifying information. It provides (in section 1.1) that "information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met:"
(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
(4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
The DOD is considered an "original classification authority," so requirement #1 is met. The report was produced by the US Government, so #2 is ok. What about #3? The categories of information that can be classified according to section 1.4 are as follows:
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction.
For the life of me, I cannot see how the Taguba report fits within any of those categories. And more importantly, section 1.7(a)(1) provides: "In no case shall information be classified in order to:
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error."
I am disappointed that no member of Congress asked Rumsfeld about this (as far as I know). There has also been very little press coverage. The Federation of American Scientists issued a press release stating "Torture Report May Have Broken Classification Rules," and according to this WP article the group sent a letter to J. William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office (the office responsible for overseeing classified material), seeking an explanation. CNet's News.com also published a story on this, and Friday's Democracy Now broadcast also mentioned the issue. But this certainly deserves more coverage, and a better explanation from the government.
Q: General, a quick follow-up on that, please. Could you explain to us why the Taguba report was classified secret, no foreign distribution? Those of us who have read the report, there's clearly nothing in there that's inherently secret, such as intelligence sources and methods or troop movements. Was this kept secret because it would be embarrassing to the world, particularly the Arab world?
GEN. PACE: First of all, I do not know specifically why it was labeled secret. Potentially there are parts of the hundreds and hundreds of pages of documentation that are classified. I do not know that to be a fact, but normally we will classify a document at the highest level of anything that's in that document.
But as the secretary pointed out, immediately we told the world that we thought we had a problem. So there has been no attempt to hide this. What we've been trying to do is find out the truth of the matter so we can get on about correcting; finding out who did what, and then taking a proper action.
Q: Mr. Secretary, can you say why it was classified secret? Do you know?
SEC. RUMSFELD: No, you'd have to ask the classifier.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: Mr. Secretary? Taking into account –
SEC. RUMSFELD: You can ask General Casey, who's going to be down here discussing that later.
I don't know whether General Casey indeed discussed that later. As far as I have been able to find, there has been no explanation for why the Taguba report was classified.
On March 25, 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order 13292 that sets forth the policies and procedures for classifying information. It provides (in section 1.1) that "information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met:"
(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
(4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
The DOD is considered an "original classification authority," so requirement #1 is met. The report was produced by the US Government, so #2 is ok. What about #3? The categories of information that can be classified according to section 1.4 are as follows:
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction.
For the life of me, I cannot see how the Taguba report fits within any of those categories. And more importantly, section 1.7(a)(1) provides: "In no case shall information be classified in order to:
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error."
I am disappointed that no member of Congress asked Rumsfeld about this (as far as I know). There has also been very little press coverage. The Federation of American Scientists issued a press release stating "Torture Report May Have Broken Classification Rules," and according to this WP article the group sent a letter to J. William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office (the office responsible for overseeing classified material), seeking an explanation. CNet's News.com also published a story on this, and Friday's Democracy Now broadcast also mentioned the issue. But this certainly deserves more coverage, and a better explanation from the government.
Command Influence
There are two lingering concerns that I have after Secretary Rumsfeld's testimony in front of Congress. First, Rumsfeld suggested that the "command influence" doctrine somehow prevented him and other high-level DOD officials from learning too much about the claims of torture because their knowledge could somehow influence military prosecutions. That is a preposterous interpretation of the command influence doctrine. The Judge Advocate General School for the Air Force has published an instruction book entitled The Military Commmander and the Law that it uses to instruct commanders on the law and "it also serves as a handy reference guide for commanders in the field, providing general guidance and helping commanders to clarify issues and identify potential problem areas." That publication has a section dedicated to "Unlawful Command Influence." It explains what the doctrine prohibits:
A superior commander must not direct a subordinate commander to impose a particular punishment or take a particular action. To do so would constitute unlawful command influence because the decision was not that of the commander taking action or imposing punishment, but rather that of the superior commander.
The key consideration is whether a commander is taking disciplinary action based upon that commander?s own personal belief that the disciplinary action is appropriate or whether the commander is merely acquiescing to direction from a superior to impose the particular discipline.
It also explains what the doctrine does not prohibit:
Superior commanders are not prohibited from establishing and communicating policies necessary to maintenance of good order and discipline. They are also free to pass on their experience and advise subordinate commanders regarding disciplinary matters. Having done so, however, the superior commander must then step back and allow the subordinates to exercise their discretion in the matter.
It is simply ridiculous to assert that the command influence doctrine prohibits Secretary Rumsfeld or General Myers (or any other commander below them) from obtaining information regarding the conduct of its troops, particularly where that information is necessary to evaluate whether troop conduct complies with the obligations imposed by the Geneva Convention. Rumsfeld and others in the chain of command should not make statements that subordinates could interpret as suggesting how a prosecution should be resolved, but of course that does not restrict the flow of information in any way. Along those lines, as the Baltimore Sun explains in this article, Rumsfeld and Bush should be more cautious when making statements like "the wrongdoers will be brought to justice" and labeling the soldiers' behavior as "un-American." But the command influence doctrine simply does not encourage a commander to stick his head in the sand and ignore reports that detail unlawful troop conduct.
A superior commander must not direct a subordinate commander to impose a particular punishment or take a particular action. To do so would constitute unlawful command influence because the decision was not that of the commander taking action or imposing punishment, but rather that of the superior commander.
The key consideration is whether a commander is taking disciplinary action based upon that commander?s own personal belief that the disciplinary action is appropriate or whether the commander is merely acquiescing to direction from a superior to impose the particular discipline.
It also explains what the doctrine does not prohibit:
Superior commanders are not prohibited from establishing and communicating policies necessary to maintenance of good order and discipline. They are also free to pass on their experience and advise subordinate commanders regarding disciplinary matters. Having done so, however, the superior commander must then step back and allow the subordinates to exercise their discretion in the matter.
It is simply ridiculous to assert that the command influence doctrine prohibits Secretary Rumsfeld or General Myers (or any other commander below them) from obtaining information regarding the conduct of its troops, particularly where that information is necessary to evaluate whether troop conduct complies with the obligations imposed by the Geneva Convention. Rumsfeld and others in the chain of command should not make statements that subordinates could interpret as suggesting how a prosecution should be resolved, but of course that does not restrict the flow of information in any way. Along those lines, as the Baltimore Sun explains in this article, Rumsfeld and Bush should be more cautious when making statements like "the wrongdoers will be brought to justice" and labeling the soldiers' behavior as "un-American." But the command influence doctrine simply does not encourage a commander to stick his head in the sand and ignore reports that detail unlawful troop conduct.
Friday, May 07, 2004
Rumsfeld's Senate Performance
The Washington Post has the transcript of Donald Rumsfeld's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee today. Pretty entertaining. John McCain's session was by far the best. Here's an excerpt:
MCCAIN: Thank you.
I'd like to know who was in charge of the -- what agencies or private contractors were in charge of interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were their instructions to the guards?
RUMSFELD: First, with respect to the...
SMITH: We did not bring it.
RUMSFELD: Oh, my.
SMITH: Yes, oh, my is right.
RUMSFELD: It was all prepared.
SMITH: Yes, it was, indeed.
RUMSFELD: Do you want to walk through it?
MCCAIN: Anyway, who was in charge? What agency or private contractor was in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions that they gave to the guards?
SMITH: I'll walk through the chain of command and...
MCCAIN: No. Let's just -- you can submit the chain of command, please.
WARNER: General Smith, do you want to respond?
MCCAIN: No. Secretary Rumsfeld, in all due respect, you've got to answer this question. And it could be satisfied with a phone call. This is a pretty simple, straightforward question: Who was in charge of the interrogations? What agencies or private contractors were in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions to the guards?
This goes to the heart of this matter.
RUMSFELD: It does indeed.
MCCAIN: Thank you.
I'd like to know who was in charge of the -- what agencies or private contractors were in charge of interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were their instructions to the guards?
RUMSFELD: First, with respect to the...
SMITH: We did not bring it.
RUMSFELD: Oh, my.
SMITH: Yes, oh, my is right.
RUMSFELD: It was all prepared.
SMITH: Yes, it was, indeed.
RUMSFELD: Do you want to walk through it?
MCCAIN: Anyway, who was in charge? What agency or private contractor was in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions that they gave to the guards?
SMITH: I'll walk through the chain of command and...
MCCAIN: No. Let's just -- you can submit the chain of command, please.
WARNER: General Smith, do you want to respond?
MCCAIN: No. Secretary Rumsfeld, in all due respect, you've got to answer this question. And it could be satisfied with a phone call. This is a pretty simple, straightforward question: Who was in charge of the interrogations? What agencies or private contractors were in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions to the guards?
This goes to the heart of this matter.
RUMSFELD: It does indeed.
Thursday, May 06, 2004
My Prediction
Either Rumsfeld or Myers will be looking for a new job by the time the weekend is over.
Re: Abu Ghraib
Just a brief follow-up on the previous post. I think there are three distinct and interesting threads to follow on this incident: a) How many troops/contractors had direct involvement in or knowledge of these events, and what will the consequences be for them, b) what sort of policy mistakes were made by higher ranking officers and officials that allowed this sort of conduct to take place and to go unnoticed long enough for it to get so out of hand, who will be held accountable, to what degree, and what procedural changes will be implemented, c) have there been any efforts at a cover-up, if so, who was involved and how far up the chain of command did it go. It may be some time before all of this becomes clear...
Wednesday, May 05, 2004
Dan Rather and CBS Sat On Abu Ghraib Story for Two Weeks...
... at the request of General Myers. So says the WP. That would not be too problematic in itself, except that General Myers claimed on ABCNews This Week (sorry, I couldn't find the transcript) that he hadn't yet read the Taguba memo (it apparently was working its way up the chain of command). And today, President Bush said during an interview on Al Hurra (an Arab television station):
Q When did you learn about the -- did you see the pictures on TV? When was the first time you heard about --
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the first time I saw or heard about pictures was on TV. However, as you might remember, in early January, General Kimmitt talked about a investigation that would be taking place about accused -- alleged improprieties in the prison. So our government has been in the process of investigating.
So let me get this straight--General Myers knew that CBS was going to break a story about prison abuses, but did not bother to get his hands on--and read--the Taguba report the two weeks during which he managed to stall the CBS story? Moreover, why didn't General Myers talk to the President about the CBS story that was bound to hit soon? Or are we supposed to understand President Bush's response as an equivocation--that he did not see or hear about pictures until the 60 Minutes II story? Give me a break. The Bush administration was keeping wraps on the Taguba report and other instances of abuse that they knew of (those murdered in Afghanistan, for instance), hoping that the stories would never see the light of day. And President Bush has the audacity to say, in that interview with the Arab TV station:
And secondly, there is investigations to determine how widespread abuse may be occurring. And we want to know the truth. I talked to the Secretary of Defense this morning, by the way. I said, find the truth, and then tell the Iraqi people and the world the truth. We have nothing to hide. We believe in transparency, because we're a free society. That's what free societies do. They -- if there's a problem, they address those problems in a forthright, up-front manner. And that's what's taking place.
Q When did you learn about the -- did you see the pictures on TV? When was the first time you heard about --
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the first time I saw or heard about pictures was on TV. However, as you might remember, in early January, General Kimmitt talked about a investigation that would be taking place about accused -- alleged improprieties in the prison. So our government has been in the process of investigating.
So let me get this straight--General Myers knew that CBS was going to break a story about prison abuses, but did not bother to get his hands on--and read--the Taguba report the two weeks during which he managed to stall the CBS story? Moreover, why didn't General Myers talk to the President about the CBS story that was bound to hit soon? Or are we supposed to understand President Bush's response as an equivocation--that he did not see or hear about pictures until the 60 Minutes II story? Give me a break. The Bush administration was keeping wraps on the Taguba report and other instances of abuse that they knew of (those murdered in Afghanistan, for instance), hoping that the stories would never see the light of day. And President Bush has the audacity to say, in that interview with the Arab TV station:
And secondly, there is investigations to determine how widespread abuse may be occurring. And we want to know the truth. I talked to the Secretary of Defense this morning, by the way. I said, find the truth, and then tell the Iraqi people and the world the truth. We have nothing to hide. We believe in transparency, because we're a free society. That's what free societies do. They -- if there's a problem, they address those problems in a forthright, up-front manner. And that's what's taking place.
Tuesday, May 04, 2004
The Taguba Report
Complements of MSNBC, here is the full U.S. Army report discussing the widespread abuses of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (or so I've heard--I haven't gotten around to reading this monster yet). Thank you Josh Marshall for pointing to the link (Talking Points Memo has really made itself into a halfway decent blog. It would be all the way decent if they had a slogan like ours).
Just A Question
I was just reading CSM's wrap-up of Abu-Ghraib news, and I had this question: After Fallujah, after Bush's statements on Sharon's plan, after Abu Ghraib, what Muslim arab would dare to align themselves with the US? Of course, according to CSM "this latest incident may not have made all that much difference to many in the Arab world because their opinion of the US had already sunk as low as it could". Whew! Thank goodness for that. I thought this torture thing was really going to hurt us.
Abu Ghraib Prison--Where Democracy Goes to Die
Seymour Hersch once again presents enlightening coverage of the situation and its history in this month's New Yorker Magazine. Horrible atrocities were being reported as early as fall and should have been known to American leaders on all levels no later than February, but some officials maintain they did not learn of any problems with prisoners in our custody until the story was broadcast on 60 Minutes II. How the story will affect the teflon president and American sentiment on the war remains to be seen. But we can be sure that America has just lost its last few friends in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.
Friday, April 30, 2004
Re: Thank God We Rescued the Iraqis...
President Bush has this to say today from his rose garden (see here [ABC News]):
A year ago, I did give a speech from the carrier saying that we have achieved an important objective, that we had accomplished a mission, which was the removal of Saddam Hussein. And as a result there are no longer torture chambers or rape rooms or mass graves in Iraq. As a result a friend of terror has been removed and now sits in a jail. I also said on that carrier that day that there was still difficult work ahead....
Of course, he must have meant no more torture chambers or rape rooms run by Saddam.
A year ago, I did give a speech from the carrier saying that we have achieved an important objective, that we had accomplished a mission, which was the removal of Saddam Hussein. And as a result there are no longer torture chambers or rape rooms or mass graves in Iraq. As a result a friend of terror has been removed and now sits in a jail. I also said on that carrier that day that there was still difficult work ahead....
Of course, he must have meant no more torture chambers or rape rooms run by Saddam.
Thank God We Rescued the Iraqis...
...from Saddam's torture chambers. I mean, that way we can hook the electrodes to their testicles ourselves. Adnan Al-Pachachi comes to the US's defense, noting that while Saddam tortured and killed his prisoners, the US only tortures the prisoners, but doesn't kill them. Of course, judging by Tuesday's Afghanistan article, it's only a matter of time before we start killing them too.
Alright, so clearly it's disingenuous to suggest that this is in any way US policy. However, I think it's entirely appropriate to suggest that the US government has completely failed in their task of preparing soldiers for the work required of them. Since the close of the Cold War the US army has been mostly used for interventions and peace-keeping operations. And the likelihood that we'll engage in a large-scale conventional war anytime in the next decade or so is exceedingly slim. Yet the military has stubbornly refused to accept that peacekeeping is an important duty that is required of them. Instead of preparing for it, they whine and moan each time that their soldiers are not prepared for this and don't know what to do, and, boy, what difficult and compromising position we're putting them in. Oh, poor me. The Bush administration came in with the same mind-set, and in 2002 they shut down the Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute (which, of course, only had a budget of $200k and a staff of 10 people anyway). So every time that the military screws up in Iraq and we hear the familiar refrain they were trying to perform a job they were never trained for, let's keep in mind that this is only the case because both civilian and military leadership refuse to admit the by-now obvious reality that peacekeeping is a vital part of the military's mission.
Alright, so clearly it's disingenuous to suggest that this is in any way US policy. However, I think it's entirely appropriate to suggest that the US government has completely failed in their task of preparing soldiers for the work required of them. Since the close of the Cold War the US army has been mostly used for interventions and peace-keeping operations. And the likelihood that we'll engage in a large-scale conventional war anytime in the next decade or so is exceedingly slim. Yet the military has stubbornly refused to accept that peacekeeping is an important duty that is required of them. Instead of preparing for it, they whine and moan each time that their soldiers are not prepared for this and don't know what to do, and, boy, what difficult and compromising position we're putting them in. Oh, poor me. The Bush administration came in with the same mind-set, and in 2002 they shut down the Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute (which, of course, only had a budget of $200k and a staff of 10 people anyway). So every time that the military screws up in Iraq and we hear the familiar refrain they were trying to perform a job they were never trained for, let's keep in mind that this is only the case because both civilian and military leadership refuse to admit the by-now obvious reality that peacekeeping is a vital part of the military's mission.
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