A 9/11 Post

I'm reposting this from a forum where I wrote it in response to a posting of this NPR essay by Frank Miller:

Sadly I think Miller had the right of it before the attacks. It is about the ideas. Strip the United States of the ideas of Madison, Jefferson, Franklin, and Adams, and I will have no attachment to the flag. To the extent I currently have some attachment to it, it is because I believe that it still represents those ideas. I don't believe that lines on a map convey some magic value, or that there is some genetic reason why Americans are more valuable than anyone else. What binds us together and gives us value is our shared belief in concepts about justice, liberty, and equality, government and social institutions; the Enlightenment ideals of Locke, Jefferson, and Madison. When those concepts take a back seat to the flag and patriotism, we have lost something important, and become less than we were.

A nation is the wrong scope in which to view Franklin's hang together/hang separately quote. Our world has gone global. There is no country that can close off the world or effectively protect itself from what happens outside it. It was not a nation state that attacked us, nor will a lone nation state protect us. Globalized business, fueled by multinational corporations, modern transportation, and electronic communications, has limited the role of the nation state in trade and economics, and terrorism has done the same for security and violence. For there is now no border and no army that can stop violence. Violence and instability can spread by interpersonal networks, and even by the simple conveyance of ideas and ideals.

For better or worse, Mankind is in this together, and together we will succeed or together we will fail. We can choose between global brotherhood and global chaos. The more borders we erect, the more boundaries we create, the more sides we choose and groups we vilify, the more separate we see ourselves from others in our minds and in reality, the less the secure our civilization will be. Because our civilization is those ideas of Madison, Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin, and we will not spread them by building walls, and they will not take hold at the point of a gun, nor can we even protect those ideals in our own nation when we put that nation before them.

Our ideals are our civilization and also its most powerful weapons. The shrinking of the world, its growing interdependence and interconnectedness grants us an overpowering advantage. When given a fair chance those ideals will triumph (and always have) because they represent the best products of Mankind's unique ability to rationally reflect upon his own place in the world. They are not the result of a particular culture or historical heritage, but of the essence of what divides Man from the beasts. And when they spread to another people or another corner of the globe, we have won the most decisive victory possible, because they are now us.

Patriotism to a nation state will not spread our ideals, but it can blind us to our kinship and our shared interests and shared fate with those outside our border. When we choose to cheer for our team rather than our ideals we not only fail to spread those ideals, but we make them unpalatable to anyone on another team. Even the most appealing ideals can be poisonous when packaged in arrogance, pride, and inequity.

There is yet a place for nations and for force of arms. There are threats to be countered, villains to be neutralized. But the state must be an instrument of our ideals, and not the reverse. The state serves our will, and, if our civilization is to endure, we must serve our shared ideals. There is indeed something precious in our civilization, and indeed something perishable. It is not vulnerable to bombs and missiles, but it is vulnerable to our own disloyalty. Terrorism is not a threat to us because it sheds our blood, but because it can cause us to forget who we are and what we hold dear.

A Defense of Intellectualism

I've been absent here for over a month now (just haven't had much inspiration for posting), so I thought I'd copy over something I wrote for a discussion I was having elsewhere. Brief synopsis: the discussion revolved around violence in black culture in America (I'm sure you can guess the basis), and after a couple of people (not me) introduced references to books and studies and such they drew several replies critical of their "book learnin" and their air of intellectual superiority as compared to common sense and life experience. My reply follows:

"For every complex problem there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong."
-H.L. Mencken

I find this very interesting, I was having a discussion last night with a friend on nearly this very topic. Bertrand Russell in his classic book, The History of Western Philosophy, frames the last several hundred years of Western philosophy as a struggle between the Enlightenment empiricists and reactionary Romantics. It's a theme I've recently run across (in nearly identical terms) again reading Edward O. Wilson's Consilience, and very distinct threads of the same issues popped up in the documentary about the neocons, The Power of Nightmares that I posted on over the summer.

The basic idea is this:

The millenia before the Enlightenment (basically from the end of the Roman Empire on) was a vast wasteland for thought and discovery. For various reasons (mostly relating to the dominance of religious philosophy) little of value happened in the realm of philosophy or science. Eventually empiricism happened along (thanks in no small part to John Locke) and the Enlightenment was born.

Philosophers and intellectuals realized they had uncovered a tool of amazing power to learn about the world around them, and science as a meaningful discipline was created. These early Enlightenment philosophers were awash in optimism believing that in no time they would map out all of the knowledge to be had and perfect mankind in our interactions with the world and one another. As time went on what they discovered that while empiricism was able to unlock the secrets of the physical world at a phenomenal rate, human interaction was a different story. Human society is too complex, has too many variables and dimensions and does not yield to the scientific method in the straightforward way that physics or chemistry does. Empirical truths, they felt, do exist that govern the relations of man, but they would be painfully slow in yielding to empirical study (which is not to say that they did not develop important advances in government and economics). In the meantime we would simply have to live with the uncertainty of knowing that the truth is out there, but that we don't necessarily yet know what it is.

The Romantics, beginning mostly with Rousseau (who is the villain of Russell's tale) rejected this uncertainty and opted instead for answers that were simple, neat, and wrong, based mostly in existing cultural or religious values or in the naive sort of philosophy the preceded the Enlightenment. Rousseau rejected empiricism as the means to discover truth, and held science to be incompatible with virtue. Rousseau believed that truth should be found, not "from the principles of a high philosophy", but "in the depths of my heart, written by Nature in ineffaceable characters." He thought that conscience and intuition should be the only guide and "we are thus freed from all this terrifying apparatus of philosophy; we can be men without being learned; dispensed from wasting our life in the study of morals, we have at less cost a more assured guide in this immense labyrinth of human opinions."

Fast forward 250 years and we are still locked in this same battle between empiricism and romanticism. The terms have hardly changed a lick. The Lockian empirical perspective has descended through our Founding Fathers and the ever-increasing reach of scientific discovery, while Rousseau's Romanticism has passed down through Kant, Hegel, the Transcendentals, and the Straussian neoconservatives. We see it expressed in battles between empirical relativism and absolute moralism, between the scientific method and truth by revelation (intelligent design), in the clash between modernity and traditional cultural values (a thread that manifests itself both domestically between red and blue politics and internationally between the modern West and extreme Islam), and in the certainty of neocon policy in face of contrary data. The conflict between Locke and Rousseau is the defining conflict of mankind these last 250 years and looks to be nowhere near resolved.

And here we are arguing over whether common sense intuition is superior to book-learnin.

I don't mean to be rude, but I do think that intuition informed by book-learnin is superior to naked intuition. I believe in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the importance of empiricism. I choose Locke.

And I would note that empiricism does not dismiss the importance of intuition. Intuition is a critical element of the Scientific Method and guides its every step. But it is not an end point. It is the starting point. It provides the questions and the hypotheses that empirical study then attempts to evaluate. Intuition anchored by evidence, is to my mind, clearly superior to intuition alone.

Re: A Critique of Social Science (part I)

Hank, sorry it's taken so long to respond on this. You've got a lot of interesting stuff there. I agree with the general assertion that there is some barrier of irreducible complexity beyond which the scientific method cannot yield verifiable results, and that as a general matter the social sciences fall on the wrong side of that barrier. I like your thought that deductive arguments should be given greater consideration in social sciences, and that it is possible and desirable to more frequently argue from first principles.

I was just talking with Mr. Veritas about this, and we formulated a number of criticisms. In some instances your theory seems underinclusive (i.e. much of this criticism could apply to elements of the hard sciences), in others, overinclusive (experimentation in social sciences can uncover something of truth). Implicit in that discussion is exactly what composes this barrier of complexity, and where it precisely lies. I think it's also an interesting question to what extent that barrier is malleable based on technological capability and keen insight. I am also not sure that we know that there are significant quantum effects that govern the operation of the brain which would place human behavior conclusively on the far side of the complexity barrier. V raises the question of whether Chaos Theory can shine any light on complex human interactions despite the inability to model a single human. Also, I'm not certain that the application of research in the social sciences is as separate from deductive reasoning as you suggest. I'm going to address this last point now, with the added hope of fleshing out your theory through some discussion of application. I will try to take up some of the other topics in the coming week or two as time allows, I know V is hoping to post some on this, and we're hoping to drag Ryan in as well, particularly on the fact questions relating to the brain and chaos theory.

First, I disagree with your characterization of Rabin's paper as purely a quixotic exercise attacking a long-defunct economic model. The rational, utility-maximizing actor is a staple of Western economic theory (although apparently not the Austrian theory). I would very much appreciate it if you could elucidate the basic deductive argument for Mises' irrational capitalism. I understand that as an advocate of the Austrian School, you reject Rabin's position for the reasons you stated, but as your audience is not necessarily familiar with (or in agreement with) the Austrian economic theory, we would be well served to hear where the foundation lies, if not on rational actors. The balance of the criticism of Rabin's positions seems largely reliant upon this.

Moreover it doesn't strike me that Homo Economicus is a concession to modeling. As far as I can tell, he rather resembles a deductive device. As an example here is a premise from James Mill's deductive argument for democracy (my paraphrase): Human beings apply accessible government power (rationally) to serve their own pleasure and avoid pain. The premise of Homo Economicus (again, my paraphrase): Human beings act (rationally) in markets to serve their own pleasure and avoid pain. These sound very similar to me. I know the former is an element of deduction, why not the latter? On what distinction do you separate Homo Economicus from a premise of deductive argument and name it a predictive modeling approximation? To the extent that Rabin is criticizing a deductive premise, is he not applying research in the role that you suggest for the social sciences?

I also don't see the inherent conflict between relevant data and calculable data. It is indisputable that deductive arguments call up many controversies of fact (see any legal decision). It is also true that some issues of fact are more critical in a given argument than others, and that some issues of fact yield more easily to research than others, and finally that the ones more easily researched are not necessarily going to be the ones that are most critical. However, I see no problem with researchers, faced with this dilemma, plucking the low-hanging fruit. If some premise of the argument is easily assessed through research, why not engage in that research even if it is not the most critical premise? Some premises will necessarily remain within the realm of rhetorical debate indefinitely (or nearly so), but those for which useful insight can be gained through research should be examined. There is the possibility that undue focus and disproportionate resources will be applied to those areas which do yield insight through research and experimentation, and I agree that this could be a problem. However, this is a problem of resource allocation, and I don't think taints the results of the research.

I'll hold off until hearing more of the Austrian School before really engaging this issue, but my feeling is that the rational maximizer is a fundamental underlying premise of nearly all Enlightenment social, political, and economic thought -- fundamental to the point of frequently going unstated. And thus data that suggests limits on the rational maximizing function carry wide-ranging ramifications. I would also suggest, that behavioral criticism aside, the rational maximizer is a generally defensible, useful, and important premise.

p.s. Mr. V highly recommends the book Consilience by Edward O. Wilson on this topic. Hopefully he'll say more on that. If you get a chance you might check it out and provide some feedback.

Careful To Inform Ourselves

From my reading of Betrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy I wanted to excerpt a section that Russell himself excerpted from John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Russell uses this section to demonstrate the sort of moderation, forebearance, and acceptance of multiple viewpoints that Russell finds characteristic of the early enlightenment, a reaction to the intolerance, bloodshed, and destruction of the Reformation and the 30 Years War. It serves that purpose, but it also struck me as an elegant statement of collegiality and a guideline for productive discourse. This passage certainly holds with Henry's feelings that people of earlier times had a much better command of the language, and it also has prompted me to use the word "methinks" more often. The excerpt follows:

"Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have several opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs of their truth; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently upon the the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer and show the insufficiency of; it would, methinks, become all men to maintain peace and the common offices of humanity and friendship in the diversity of opinions, since we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours with a blind resignation to an authority which the understanding of man acknowledges not. For, however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your sentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what is out of mind, examine the particulars, to see on which side the advantage lies; and if he will not think over arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we do often ourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss of others should prescribe to us what points we should study: and if he be one who wishes to take his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty; or which he takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men sent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions thus settled should be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary? Especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as there never fails to be where men find themselves ill-treated. We should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information, and not instantly treat others ill as obstinate and perverse because they will not renounce their own and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has uncontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of all he condemns; or can say, that he has examined to the bottom of all his own or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing without knowledge, nay, often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than to restrain others... There is reason to think, that if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others."

I find Locke, based on Russell's treatment of him, to be admirable in many respects, and well deserving of the place history has given him. His pragmatism and reasonableness set him apart from many of his contemporaries. Where Liebniz, Descartes, and Spinoza construct elaborate, unified theories of philosophy, which, looking back, now appear absurd, Locke had no grand theory and applied himself in areas where he felt that the new empiricism could yield new insights. While certain of his ideas have come to appear to be as absurd as others, they are all guided by a keen intuition and reasonable logical arguments. And as Russell argues, even in many cases where Locke was wrong he created systems of thought that proved very productive to other theorists. He intuitively avoids many of the pitfalls of linguistic issues (universals, substance, and essence and the like) that had much occupied Plato and Aristotle and had sent astray nearly every philospher since the early Greeks. In his embrace of empiricism he laid a sound foundation on which other Enlightenment philosophers would build.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

A few points...

Barry, I think we are focusing on different elements of the statement I quoted from the article (which I can only assume is an accurate assessment of Montequieu's position). You noted that it is expectation that drives revolution. I noted that "the people" need to be prodded along by reforms originating, presumably, from somewhere other than "the people". The latter statement is very much in keeping with Orwell's themes.

On the points you both posted regarding hierarchy of needs and individual empowerment, I would tend to favor Ryan's position. Unless I'm mistaken, most of the peasantry was dirt poor in both the Russian and French revolutions. The role of reform, I think, in inspiring revolution was not so much that it lifted the peasants to a more secure lifestyle, but that it gave them courage question and oppose their governments.

Regarding wealth and materialism, I would definitely favor Frank's position. In countries of great wealth (think Japan and the US), materialism is enshrined rather than reduced. In fact, this is something I wish that Putnam might have studied as a factor in community involvement. I can think of a lot of annecdotal evidence that wealth is tied to a greater focus on personal attainment, where poverty creates more focus on community support. I don't, however, have any great evidence to back that up. It also tends to run contrary to my general feeling that Orwell's assessments are correct.

Also, and this could almost be separate (but related) topic, I was doing some reading in the "Market For Civil War" article in the same FP Magazine which looks at the financial causes of civil war. I was not impressed. First, they bounce back and forth between issues of absolute wealth and relative wealth without distinguishing between the two at all. Also much of their evidence was rather specious.

They pointed out that once a nation reaches a high per capita, the "risk of revolution is negligible". Of course, all the countries they seem to be referring to in that category are liberal democracies. Might that have a something to do with it? The Soviet Union faced economic hardship, but it was still relatively well off when it suffered a massive (albeit bloodless) revolution.

Similarly they supposed that wealth distribution was not a major factor, presenting as evidence that while Columbia suffered for that cause, Brazil "got away" with it. I'd say if 50% of countries with a high inequality of wealth suffer civil wars, that would make it a pretty major factor. Further that, as I mentioned recently to Barry, the other South American countries, including Brazil, that haven't seen recent revolutions are not out of the woods yet. They are facing severe problems with their democratic governments as progressive leadership is elected by the masses and has to go head to head with a small, but incredibly powerful upper class that has heretofore dominated the political system. Argentina has been hovering on the brink of total collapse for some time now, Venzuela just recently stepped back from the edge of civil war, and Brazil is now facing their first such challenge by a progressive government to the entrenched power of the wealthy. The verdict is certainly not in as to whether these democracies will survive their disparities of wealth.

For this very reason, however, I do support the authors' contention that democracy holds no promise of political stability for developing nations. I have serious doubts as to how well democracy can survive in this nation as the disparity of wealth grows. In most developing nations the situation is much worse. I continue to believe that having a large and healthy middle class is a crucial element to a strong democracy. Additionally, it has long been my contention that there needs to be a high level of social and cultural buy-in for democracy to succeed. Democracy is a fragile form of government which offers opportunities for corruption and subversion at every turn. Most developing nations are just not there yet. And this is a major difference of opinion between myself and these authors who completely dismiss the role of culture and historical background in civil war.

But I also have some agreement with the conclusions of the article. One of the elements they stress is the role of international peacekeepers. This I could not agree with more. I think that more than anything we need to buy time for these nations and provide them with the stability they need to grow the cultural, economic and educational infrastructure they need to create a stable government. And to otherwise get out of their way and let them do it. Some lessons can only be learned by experience...

I keep coming back to Iran. I just wish we could have seen what would have happened to them had the whole axis of evil thing never occurred. They had just the incremental reforms and high expectations we've been talking about. They've completely rejected foreign influence for 20 years and at the same time toppled the old aristocracy, and have come around to democracy on their own terms. They have a strong sense of national identity, unity, and pride. And even the newly entrenched powers were recognizing the need to change and liberalise. These are precisely the conditions that I would view ideal for the creation of a healthy and stable democracy. I couldn't write a better script. Unfortunately, by continuously rattling our sabre at Iran and praising the reformers we are tainting them with the perception of being American agents. This in a country that topped out Foreign Policy's chart (same issue) of popular nationalism and that is rabidly anti-colonialist.

And what a powerful example they could have been to the developing world. To demonstrate that nationalism and indepence from the colonial powers, the liberal democracies, is not, in fact, incompatible with the development of one's own liberal democracy. The neo-cons have been hoping that in Iraq they could create a shining example democracy for the middle east. That could have been, should have been, Iran. How much more powerful a demonstration would it have been to show them that they could get where they need to go without having to capitulate to the hated imperialists...

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

Barry, I dare say you and Joe know as much (if not more) about psychological theories than I, so I won't make any attempt to correct you. I will only say that Maslow wasn't the only one to recognize the priority of personal security for the individual. Indeed, Sullivan, a psychiatrist contemporary to Maslow's time, believed that the maintainance of personal security is what drives our behavior and becomes maladaptive in psychiatric illness. But I digress...

I think there is a point we need to be clear on. We seem to agree that Montesquieu's position is that conditions for revolution are ripe when there is an expectation of change. Barry then goes on to comment on observation and perception of disparity, but I think this already begins to stray from Montesquieu's point (at least as I interpreted it). The majority can perceive or observe all the disparity it wants, but unless it expects that disparity to change (e.g. perestroika, solidarity), it will do nothing to attempt to alter current conditions. This, I think, is the biggest difference between the plebes vs. the middle/upper class. By definition, the middle/upper class will have had more success socially, economically, or both. Success emboldens individuals, and they learn that change is possible. They learn that they are empowered. I doubt that their sense of security or knowledge of conditions differs markedly from the plebes. Rather, the middle/upper class is more conscious of the situation because it thinks it can change it.

Back to Joe's original question: Can the plebes truly be made politically enlightened? I struggle with this question. I think they can be, but it is a great challenge that requires specific conditions. First, a large disparity (or perceived disparity) has to exist for the majority. Second, someone has to empower them by demonstrating that change is possible, even if there is resistance at the top.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

Please excuse any chaos in my thoughts, as I have not fully ripened them. But I still wanted to add whatever I could to this conversation.

I'm not sure that Montesquieu and Orwell are all that similar. Without reading Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws, which is where I presume Montesquieu expresses the opinion set out in the Foreign Policy article, I understand this quote as an observation that people's expectations are what matters more than actual position. If the majority observes a disparity in wealth or condition, they are more likely to revolt because the inequality is salient. I apologize to Montesquieu if that is not his position, but it makes sense to me.

While Montesquieu seems to focus on the ideal conditions for revolution, Joe's statement of Orwell seems to focus on the locus of revolutionary change. Joe's contention is well formed and supported by the examples he gives. But without a more developed understanding of history, I cannot add to or challenge this contention. Assuming it is true, then, let me offer one possible explanation why revolution occurs in the middle- (or upper-middle) class. Ryan, I beseech you to clarify or correct any part of the following as necessary. There is a humanistic branch of motivational psychology (is this the same/related to behavioral psychology?) most well-recognized by Abraham Maslow's theory of the "Hierarchy of Needs," well summarized here. In short, Maslow theorized that lower-level needs (psychological and safety needs) must be satisfied before we are to pursue higher aims, like esteem needs and self-actualization.

I suggest that revolution only becomes a pursuit of some threshold segment of society when other, lower-level needs are met. Because the middle-class as a group is more likely to feel safe and needs to devote considerably less effort toward the basics, they may turn their attention to higher ideals like freedom, equality, and justice. One might wonder, then, why it is the middle-class alone and not all of the upper segment of society that joins in this revolutionary spirit, but I think there is a ready and self-evident reply. The highest of society becomes blind to these ideals by greed and self-interest, just as the lower realms of society are made ignorant by their desire to satisfy basic desires.

Apparently, I am not the first to stumble on this argument. Professor Ronald Inglehart wrote a book entitled, The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among western publics. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1977), discussing how an increase in wealth might lead to less focus on materialism, which in turn could mean greater political participation. An interesting critique of Professor Inglehart may be found here.

The only challenge I have to this line of thought is that, if authors like Robert H. Frank (Luxury Fever) are correct, wealth is always relative, so materialism is more like a treadmill than part of the hierarchy. Again, it may be perception that matters most--if people perceive that their material needs are satisfied, they may indeed turn to higher ideals (freedom, justice, and equality), but there seems to be no end to material desire.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

Joe, I think this has some interesting implications for the external revolutions (most recently Afghanistan and Iraq). What happens when oppressed individuals are suddenly "released" from the regime that had oppressed them? If Montesquieu is right, then these people might just begin to carry out their own internal revolution after experiencing the change associated with the external revolution. A clear demonstration of this in Iraq occurred with the Shiite demonstrations. I'm not sure I have seen any evidence of internal revolution or change in Afghanistan, where the culture is generally less educated than in Iraq. It seems to me that an interaction takes place between rising expectations and education (and likely other factors). If a sufficient level of education exists (whatever that is) along with rising expectations for change, this class is likely to lead further change. Perhaps the poor/uneducated are relatively unable to organize in an effective manner? Or is it that they just don't comprehend the improvements that could be made in their lives?

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

I had a brief discussion with Barry a couple weeks ago regarding the thresholds of social change, and was brought back to that reading the Foreign Policy Mag article on North Korea. In the article the authors reference the position of pre-revolution French philosopher Montesquieu that "revolutions don't occur when the people's conditions are at rock bottom but when reform creates a spiral of expectations that spurs people to action against the old stultifying system."

It's an interesting statement. There are some echoes of it in Orwell's "1984", which delves into the subject of revolution and how to create a society wherein revolution is impossible. His position is that popular revolutions only occur when driven by the efforts of the upper-middle class to bring social reform. The poor and downtrodden present no threat, on their own, to the social order, and are regarded as such by Big Brother.

Discarding revolutions largely driven by outside influence (Iran, Afghanistan, and such), it is difficult to find a counter-example to this theory. China, perhaps, but it would be highly debatable. In the US, the colonists were by no means downtrodden and in fact were in many ways well off compared to their European counterparts. And it was the new and more equitable social structure of the New World that put their expectations at such a level that the revolution occurred. In France and Russia, revolution was preceded by an effort by aristocrats to limit the power of the king. They rallied popular support for these efforts, creating expectations in the people that these limited reforms could not meet, setting the stage for rebellion. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's sweeping reform policies of Glasnost and Perestroika were clearly instrumental in the fall of the Iron Curtain.

The flip-side of this proposition is demonstrated by the failure of the embargoes of Cuba and Iraq. Constant outside pressure created an atmosphere of paranoia where the aristocrats had no breathing room to consider reform. The people of these nations were left so destitute and hopeless that little effort was ever made to topple their governments.

And in the end, this ties back, once again, to the inescapable discussion of the role of the intellectuals (typically aristocrats) in guiding the plebes and its impact on the structure of government. Can the plebes truly be made politically enlightened? And if not, where does that leave democracy and the Enlightenment vision of equality?