If You Could Lock a Man Up...

...for violating Godwin's Law, Donald Rumsfeld would spend the rest of his life in the joint.

We've Got 'Em on the Run!

I haven't blogged anything for a month, but I really couldn't pass this by. Donald Rumsfeld wrote a column for the Washington Post to let us all know that our opponents know they're losing in Iraq. It was annoying at first when he would try to convince everyone that up was down, then it came to be funny, but now it's just kind of pathetic. The more the situation (and popular opinion of it) changes the more this man's bullshit stays exactly the same. It will be interesting to see how Iraq plays out in the mid-term elections. It is rapidly becoming very unpopular, but the Democrats still seem to be (as seen with Feingold's censure effort) incredibly squeamish over anything relating to security. If they drop the ball on this again, I will be physically ill.

Philosophies of the Global War On Terror

Thanks to a random slashdot post I came across a very interesting documentary today. It's called The Power of Nightmares, created by filmmaker Adam Curtis. There are three one-hour episodes. It is available for free download from the Internet Archive. I found their download to be very slow, and looked elsewhere. You should have no problem finding it on your bittorrent tracker of choice. The BBC also has an intersting Q and A with Curtis. I've only got the first episode so far (bloody download limits). It's a great look at the origins of the neoconservative and jihadi philosophies and their rise to power, portraying both as a rejection modernity and liberalism. There's wonderful footage of some of the primary figures (young Rumsfeld cracked me up, the man never changes). I found the Reagan-era stuff in particular to be utterly fascinating. I would love to see an academic discussion of the film. There are a gazillion discussions of it on the internet, but nearly all from highly politicized viewpoints, either accepting the film in its entirety or trashing it in every regard. One of the more substantive criticisms I could find was a charge in this National Review article that the conclusions of a book that the film attacks, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terror were later verified by the Stasi files. There is also some discussion of criticisms in the film's wikipedia entry. I found it to be fairly even-handed, at least in discussion of the philosophies (although Curtis' version of historical events seems more subject to question), and honestly thought that Leo Strauss and Sayyid Qutb (who Curtis holds to be the seminal visionaries on each side) had interesting and important points to make. It's starting to seem that many of the important political and sociological events of the day can fit within the frame of mankind struggling with the onrush of modernity.

Update (7/24): Finished watching the series. It makes some fairly startling claims in the latter part, and presents really interesting arguments to back them. Quite a thought-provoking program, you should give it a look.

The Military Spending Debacle

CSM has an article with a broad discussion on current military spending and various proposed changes. It's really a fairly absurd situation. The article notes that we will spend $667b in the next year. It mentions that the Task Force on a Unified Security Budget proposes $53b in cuts, and $40.5b in additional spending. It also discusses the proposed base closings. In inflation adjusted dollars, we are spending more on defense than we have since WWII. Adding to the absurdity of the situation, Donald Rumsfeld does want to make cuts (as per the base closings) to manpower at a time when Iraq and Afghanistan have stretched manpower perilously thin, thus leaving Congress in the position of opposing the one budget-slimming measure of an otherwise aggressively spending administration (not to mention the always pork-barrel sensitive matter of base closures).

I think any analysis of the defense budget needs to start from the recognition that the U.S. military is light-years ahead of any other in the world. Our nuclear arsenal itself is enough to ensure that U.S. will never be attacked by any nation-state. And there is not a conventional military on the planet that the U.S. could not steam-roll over. In light of these things, Rumsfeld's plans for a lighter, slimmer military make a lot of sense. However, it doesn't seem feasible to make these cuts while we are digging deep into the reserves and National Guard to keep enough troops in Iraq.

But it seems there must be places to cut, given that we had 500,000 troops in south-east Asia with a lower defense budget than we have now. Perhaps there is something to the quote in the article that we're doing a very poor job of getting reasonable prices from defense contractors (on whom our military has grown increasingly reliant). Certainly there seems to be a disturbingly incestuous relationship between the public and private military sectors (starting in the VP's office). Some of the big ticket programs (nuclear bunker-busters) seem wasteful and unnecessary as well.

Unfortunately the current politics of national defense are such that neither party could feasibly propose any significant cuts. Moreover, it is difficult to see how this could change any time soon. There was no significant focus on fiscal problems in 2004 by either side, and it seems that budget deficits would need to take an immeasurably higher profile in order to compete with the terrorist-mania that governs politics. There is a very real argument that our fiscal situation poses a greater threat to American dominance and security at the present time than terrorists, but I don't see that as a politically salable idea. It's a bloody mess, no doubt about that.

Rumsfeld update: Yep, He's Still An Asshole

This Post story on Rumsfeld's appearance before the House Armed Services Committee (full transcript) is one of the funnier things I've read lately. It's entertaining when the Bush administration sends Rumsfeld over to the hill to remind the congresspeople exactly where they stand. Aside from Rumsfeld's stubborn refusals and amusing one-liners, I found this question interesting in light of our recent discussions:

REYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here with us this morning.

I have a question for each one of you, but the first one, Mr. Secretary, deals with what I think fits under the category of where the system does not work. And it concerns the U.S. pilots that filed a lawsuit -- as this was reported in the L.A. Times on the 15th of this month, where they filed a lawsuit against Iraq for compensation.

REYES: They won their case, were awarded and now the administration is taking a position that this should be dismissed.

The irony -- there are a couple of ironies. One of them is that some of these pilots were tortured in the same Abu Ghraib prison where prisoners were abused by our troops.

And the article quotes that, Mr. Secretary, you're in favor of awarding compensation to Iraqi prisoners who were abused by U.S. military at this prison and at the same time our own pilots that have won a court case are now being denied the same kind of compensation.

I was wondering, do you have any comment on that?

RUMSFELD: Congressman, I don't. It's a matter that the Department of Justice handles for the United States government, not something the Department of Defense does.

The Rummy Returns

Oh, silly Rumsfeld. This is straight from the DOD's official transcript:

Journalist: The budget suggests that -- the budget shows that Army spending is going down by $300 million in fiscal --
Rumsfeld: Which, as you know, is not the case.
Journalist: Well, that's what I see.
Rumsfeld: Yeah, I should have mentioned that.... The only way you can look at this budget is to look at the supplementals with it, and it would be a misunderstanding of the situation to come to the conclusion that you pretended you had come to. But of course you did not, being as knowledgeable as you are.
Journalist: Well, are you hiding -- are you -- are they, in fact, hiding noncombat costs in the supplemental --
Rumsfeld: No, of course not.
Journalist: -- by accelerating here?
Rumsfeld: No, that would be wrong -- (laughter) -- and we wouldn't do that.

DOD Gets Defensive

Read this press statement put out by Pentagon spokesperson Larry DiRita. Seems like Hersh hit a sore spot.

Expanded Role of Military in Covert Operations, On To Iran

Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker has this story on Secretary Rumsfeld's effort to locate all covert operational authority within the DOD. It seems Secretary Rumsfeld has been lobbying for such a structural change for over two years, and it looks like the "accountability moment" (WP) of the 2004 presidential election will be used to further advance neocon policy. According to Hersh, Stephen Cambone and William G. Boykin, both prominent neocons within the administration, will be part of the chain of command for the new commando operations. Hersh reports that the administration has been conducting secret reconnaissance missions inside Iran since last summer, and the Pentagon is updating its military war plan against Iran, now that a full-scale invasion force could enter through Iraq. Hersh claims a former high-level intelligence official told him, "It’s not if we’re going to do anything against Iran. They’re doing it.” Apparently covert operations have also been authorized in Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Malaysia, and Tunisia.

Of the New Yorker article written by the same journalist who broke the Abu Graib story, White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett said, "I think it's riddled with inaccuracies, and I don't believe that some of the conclusions he's drawing are based on fact."

Documents on Interrogation Tactics Available at WP

The WP has scanned the documents that were released yesterday by the Bush administration. They include the 2002 memo by now-judge Bybee (who sits on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals) and several memos by White House General Counsel Gonzales. I am sure there will be lots of stories cropping up today on these memos (and I plan to make more comments when I have the time to go through those documents), but I found one scanned document particularly interesting right off the bat.

On November 27, 2002, William Haynes II recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld that certain interrogation techniques be available for detainees at Guantanamo--and Rumsfeld approved his recommendations. Among the techniques that were approved in the memo [PDF] include:

a. Category I techniques. During the initial interrogation the detainee should be provided a comfortable chair and the environment should be generally comfortable. The format of the interrogation is the direct approach. The use of rewards like cookies or cigarettes may be helpful. If the detainee is determined by the interrogator to be uncooperative, the interrogator may use the following techniques:

(1) Yelling at the detainee (not directly in his ear or to the level that it would cause physical pain or hearing problems)
(2) Techniques of deception:
(a) Multiple interrogator techniques.
(b) Interrogator identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.

b. Category II techniques. With the permission of the GIC, Interrogation Section, the interrogator may use the following techniques.

(1) The use of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours.
(2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
(3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Requests must be made to through the OIC, Interrogation Section, to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond 30 days must be approved by the Commanding General. For selected detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.
(4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth.
(5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
(6) The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during transportation and questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.
(7) The use of 28-hour interrogations.
(8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
(9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.
(10) Removal of clothing.
(11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair etc...)
(12) Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress.

The same memo also approved one item from "Category III": "Use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing."

When Secretary Rumsfeld signed off on the above techniques, he added a written notation that reads:

However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours? DR

Could It Be?

President Bush has scheduled a press conference at 11:30 ET at the Pentagon...

Update: That press conference was worthless. And my prediction was wrong. I am constantly amazed at the depth of this administration's denial. But I am even more amazed that the people have lost all affect. Rape? Torture? Those are just things that happen during wartime, and anyone who thinks otherwise is hopelessly naive. International disgrace? Who cares, so long as things look good at home. Lies? Everyone's a liar. And anyone accusing this administration of doing bad things is obviously making those accusations for political purposes.

No, the Bush administration isn't giving Rumsfeld walking papers. They are giving him accolades. President Bush (according to the AP): Secretary Rumsfeld "is doing a superb job"--he's a strong secretary and the nation owes him a debt of gratitude. Vice President Cheney (according to Reuters): He's the best Secretary of Defense the United States has ever had. People ought to get off Rumsfeld's case and let him do his job.

God bless America.

The Taguba Report and "National Security"

My second concern regarding Rumsfeld's testimony is his explanation about how the investigation of prisoner abuse was handled within the military. As Rumsfeld repeatedly emphasized, the military began an investigation in January, and we now know that Major General Taguba released his report in February. It was classified. Why? When that question was posed to Rumsfeld in a press conference on May 4th, this is what he and General Pace had to say:

Q: General, a quick follow-up on that, please. Could you explain to us why the Taguba report was classified secret, no foreign distribution? Those of us who have read the report, there's clearly nothing in there that's inherently secret, such as intelligence sources and methods or troop movements. Was this kept secret because it would be embarrassing to the world, particularly the Arab world?

GEN. PACE: First of all, I do not know specifically why it was labeled secret. Potentially there are parts of the hundreds and hundreds of pages of documentation that are classified. I do not know that to be a fact, but normally we will classify a document at the highest level of anything that's in that document.

But as the secretary pointed out, immediately we told the world that we thought we had a problem. So there has been no attempt to hide this. What we've been trying to do is find out the truth of the matter so we can get on about correcting; finding out who did what, and then taking a proper action.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you say why it was classified secret? Do you know?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, you'd have to ask the classifier.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Q: Mr. Secretary? Taking into account –

SEC. RUMSFELD: You can ask General Casey, who's going to be down here discussing that later.

I don't know whether General Casey indeed discussed that later. As far as I have been able to find, there has been no explanation for why the Taguba report was classified.

On March 25, 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order 13292 that sets forth the policies and procedures for classifying information. It provides (in section 1.1) that "information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met:"

(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
(4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.

The DOD is considered an "original classification authority," so requirement #1 is met. The report was produced by the US Government, so #2 is ok. What about #3? The categories of information that can be classified according to section 1.4 are as follows:

(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction.

For the life of me, I cannot see how the Taguba report fits within any of those categories. And more importantly, section 1.7(a)(1) provides: "In no case shall information be classified in order to:
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error."

I am disappointed that no member of Congress asked Rumsfeld about this (as far as I know). There has also been very little press coverage. The Federation of American Scientists issued a press release stating "Torture Report May Have Broken Classification Rules," and according to this WP article the group sent a letter to J. William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office (the office responsible for overseeing classified material), seeking an explanation. CNet's News.com also published a story on this, and Friday's Democracy Now broadcast also mentioned the issue. But this certainly deserves more coverage, and a better explanation from the government.

Command Influence

There are two lingering concerns that I have after Secretary Rumsfeld's testimony in front of Congress. First, Rumsfeld suggested that the "command influence" doctrine somehow prevented him and other high-level DOD officials from learning too much about the claims of torture because their knowledge could somehow influence military prosecutions. That is a preposterous interpretation of the command influence doctrine. The Judge Advocate General School for the Air Force has published an instruction book entitled The Military Commmander and the Law that it uses to instruct commanders on the law and "it also serves as a handy reference guide for commanders in the field, providing general guidance and helping commanders to clarify issues and identify potential problem areas." That publication has a section dedicated to "Unlawful Command Influence." It explains what the doctrine prohibits:

A superior commander must not direct a subordinate commander to impose a particular punishment or take a particular action. To do so would constitute unlawful command influence because the decision was not that of the commander taking action or imposing punishment, but rather that of the superior commander.

The key consideration is whether a commander is taking disciplinary action based upon that commander?s own personal belief that the disciplinary action is appropriate or whether the commander is merely acquiescing to direction from a superior to impose the particular discipline.

It also explains what the doctrine does not prohibit:

Superior commanders are not prohibited from establishing and communicating policies necessary to maintenance of good order and discipline. They are also free to pass on their experience and advise subordinate commanders regarding disciplinary matters. Having done so, however, the superior commander must then step back and allow the subordinates to exercise their discretion in the matter.

It is simply ridiculous to assert that the command influence doctrine prohibits Secretary Rumsfeld or General Myers (or any other commander below them) from obtaining information regarding the conduct of its troops, particularly where that information is necessary to evaluate whether troop conduct complies with the obligations imposed by the Geneva Convention. Rumsfeld and others in the chain of command should not make statements that subordinates could interpret as suggesting how a prosecution should be resolved, but of course that does not restrict the flow of information in any way. Along those lines, as the Baltimore Sun explains in this article, Rumsfeld and Bush should be more cautious when making statements like "the wrongdoers will be brought to justice" and labeling the soldiers' behavior as "un-American." But the command influence doctrine simply does not encourage a commander to stick his head in the sand and ignore reports that detail unlawful troop conduct.

Rumsfeld's Senate Performance

The Washington Post has the transcript of Donald Rumsfeld's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee today. Pretty entertaining. John McCain's session was by far the best. Here's an excerpt:

MCCAIN: Thank you.

I'd like to know who was in charge of the -- what agencies or private contractors were in charge of interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were their instructions to the guards?

RUMSFELD: First, with respect to the...

SMITH: We did not bring it.

RUMSFELD: Oh, my.

SMITH: Yes, oh, my is right.

RUMSFELD: It was all prepared.

SMITH: Yes, it was, indeed.

RUMSFELD: Do you want to walk through it?

MCCAIN: Anyway, who was in charge? What agency or private contractor was in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions that they gave to the guards?

SMITH: I'll walk through the chain of command and...

MCCAIN: No. Let's just -- you can submit the chain of command, please.

WARNER: General Smith, do you want to respond?

MCCAIN: No. Secretary Rumsfeld, in all due respect, you've got to answer this question. And it could be satisfied with a phone call. This is a pretty simple, straightforward question: Who was in charge of the interrogations? What agencies or private contractors were in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions to the guards?

This goes to the heart of this matter.

RUMSFELD: It does indeed.

Re: Rummy's Rules

I've seen that before, and I'm pretty sure it's authentic. Although this one seems to be missing:

-When the weapons of mass destruction that you bet the farm on don't turn up, torture the prisoners for more information.

Rummy's Rules

I don't know if this is for real, but all the better if it is (from a Daily KOS discussion).

Talking Points Memo points out that the full PDF version may be found here.

Going To Hell In A Handbasket

It's been a tough couple weeks for the coalition in Iraq. Today saw protests, riots, and gun battles across Baghdad, Ramadi, Falluja, Najaf, al-Shuala, Nasiriya, and Basra. Most of the recent trouble is coming from Shia groups who previously had not given the coalition much difficulty. Now Al-Qaeda has released a tape in which they threaten to assassinate US leaders in Iraq. Meanwhile Donald (the other "the Donald") Rumsfeld says that things are under control and we don't need more troops in Iraq. Maybe he's not reading the same news I'm reading...

For the Record

Henry Waxman, congressman from California, has had congress's Special Investigations Division compile a report studying and cataloguing each false or misleading statement about Iraq made by the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, or Security Advisor Rice. The report is 36 pages long and covers 237 statements made by these officials.

Rumsfeld: Don't Stop Believin'

Hold on to that feelin', yeah! Donald Rumsfeld is not ready to abandon hope on the WMD search. Rumsfeld claims that the ten months since the invasion have been far too little time to make a determination. This after insisting a year ago that two months for UN inspections was waiting far too long for results.

Comments on WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications

I have finished reading through the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report written by Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich (available here) that been referenced a few times on this blog, and wish to share my thoughts. Mainly, I found the report to be a good synthesis on the statements made by the administration and the evidence (or lack thereof) that is in the public domain, but I am a little disappointed that the report seems to have reached farther than necessary in some of its conclusions. Specifically, the report does not emphasize that it is based on declassified and public information, and that any conclusions that are drawn without a full analysis of the classified material is quite obviously constrained. For instance, some of the "key findings" highlighted in the very beginning of the report are:

- Iraq's WMD programs represented a long-term threat that could not be ignored, They did not, however, pose an immediate threat to the United States, to the region, or to global security.
- With respect to nuclear and chemical weapons, the extent of the threat was largely knowable at the time.
- The uncertainties were much greater with regard to biological weapons.
- There was and is no solid evidence fo a cooperative relationship between Saddam's government and Al Qaeda.


If read with the caveat, "given what is publicly available, it appear's that...," then these statements seem fair. But where does that get us? To the same place that the report arrives at--calling for a nonpartisan independent commissino to investigation the state of intelligence from 1991-present. I just don't see what is gained by the authors stating unequivocally:

Based on what has been discovered in Iraq, it is plain that the dimensions and urgency of the WMD threat were far less than protrayed. Logic and the evidence available to date suggest that the likelihood that Saddam Hussein would give whatever WMD he possessed to terrorists was also far less than the administration believed. And, the belief that deterrence coudl not be used against Iraq appears unfounded. Thus, the threat that woudl be removed by war--the benefit in a cost-benefit framework--was far less than it was asserted to be. (Page 58).

All the same, I think the authors do an excellent job raising questions and tearing down the foundation of the preemption doctrine. They also demonstrate that the administration did misrepresent some of the information that has been made public, so there is good reason to remain skeptical about what hasn't been shared.

The paper offers a quote from Former British foreign secretary Robin Cook, who resigned over the war (his resignation speech may be found here on the BBC's website) that I think is particularly fitting to our administration--on virtually every issue it has faced:

I think it would be fair to say that there was a selection of evidence to support a conclusion. I fear we got into a position in which the intelligence was not being used to inform and shape policy, but to shape policy that was already settled.

The paper argues that the spin did not stop when we began the military operation, but has continued ever since. One of my favorite sections discussed a statement by David Kay on October 2 that Iraq had a "clandestine network of laboratories" and "concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors," such as a "vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced." The report then observes:

Kay's testimony and subsequent administration statements highlighted the discovery of the vial, stored in an Iraqi scientist's kitchen refrigerator since 1993. This was the only suspicious biological material Kay had reported as of the end of December 2003. President Bush said the "live strain of deadly agent botulinum" was proof that Saddam Hussein was "a danger to the world." Several former U.S. bioweapons officials, UN inspectors, and biological experts told the Los Angeles Times that the sample was purchased from the United States in the 1980s and that no country, including Iraq, has been able to use botulinum B in a weapon. Iraq has used the more deadly botulinum A in its pre-1991 weapon program, mimicking other countries' programs, including those of the Soviet Union and the United States. (Page 35.)

I think the report does an excellent job hammering home that the administration resorted to shady rhetorical practice in selling the war, including conflating the threat from biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as all in one threat--the ominous threat from WMD. President Bush and others made references to "mushroom clouds." And virtually everyone in the administration treated Iraq as though it were an extension of al Qaeda, when no good evidence has been brought to light to demonstrate any connection.

The authors make their strongest points when addressing the Security Strategy. Much of what this report has to say echoes some of the same issues addressed by Record in "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism," discussed below, but a few points are worth highlighting. The report addresses the administration's decision to combine its preemption strategy with worst-case scenario evidence and reasoning:

The President stated the approach on October 7, 2002: "Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring." Other members of the administration made the case that because our intelligence was imperfect, we had to assume that whatever signs of WMD we did detect was a small percentage of what was actually there. These reasonable-sounding statements describe an approach that is neither safe nor wise.

Worst-case planning is a valid and vital methodology, if used with a constant awareness of its limitations and if care is taken never to confuse the results with the realistic case. Acting on worst-case assumptions is an entirely different matter. To do so is to take the assessment out of threat assessment and largely to negate the billions spent on gathering intelligence. To cite one among many reasons, it leaves one open to one of the most common tactics in the history of warfare: bluff by adversaries seeking to gain an advantage by inflating their own capabilities. (Page 54.)

And the report also suggests that we should more closely evaluate what residual role deterrence plays in a post- 9/11 world. The administration suspended decades of global security policy by fiat and without second thoughts, because it took for granted that 9/11 changed everything and made this doctrine antiquated. The paper quotes Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld:

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on September 11th." (Page 57, quoting testimony Rumsfeld made before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, 2003, available here).

Rumsfeld on Memo

This is from Sunday:

Q: Quoting a DoD memo which says that they are detailing contacts between al-Qaeda and the regime of Saddam Hussein?

Rumsfeld: Haven’t seen the article.

Q: Can you comment on your view of Iraq Saddam contacts with al-Qaeda?

Rumsfeld: Nothing to add. My understanding from Larry (Larry Di Rita, acting assistant Secretary of Defense for public affairs) is that the article is just the article that it may have a reference – be a reference to some testimony that DoD representatives had before Congressional Committees many, many weeks and months ago. And that some questions were asked and they require that their responses be submitted for the record and that those responses may have just gone in recently but there is nothing new there.

Q: Secretary on the council, while you say there’s no direct link?

Rumsfeld: I haven’t seen the article so I shouldn’t say there’s nothing new. I don’t know of anything.