The Other Side of Hugo Chavez

Hugo Chávez played into American caricatures with his anti-Bush campaign at the UN, but it bothered me in the aftermath of the speech to hear certain US officials and commentators refer to him as some sort of tyrant or dictator. We would do well to recall the he is, in fact, wildly popular in Venezuela. Current polls have him beating his opponent in tomorrow's election by a 2-1 margin. Like most South American countries Venezuela suffers from an immensely unequal division of wealth (the article cites one claim that the poverty rate in Venezuela is 70%). Chávez has redirected oil wealth to provide education, health care, and basic sustenance for the nation's many impoverished citizens. It's far from clear whether Chávez's policies will accomplish much in the long term, but he has at least taken steps to address the problem, which itself represents a change from past leadership.

In posts past I've wondered what is the proper means to address the lingering impacts of colonialism in South America and other developing regions. Even a hardened libertarian like Nozick calls for redistributive policies where an allocation of resources was achieved through means not consonant with Lockean justice in acquisition. Until the recent wave of populist leaders was elected in South America redistribution of this sort was likely impossible as the wealthy by and large controlled the levers of power. Now that it is possible, the West and the international development institutions (the UN, IMF, World Bank) appear to have little interest in providing assistance, guidance, and advice in this process. This sort of pure redistribution is heretical to modern economic principles, but I think we need to recognize these situations as a special case, one where the general principles don't apply well (which is why all these populist leaders were elected in the first place). I don't know if what Chávez is doing is right, but if it's not I wish we could respond with constructive criticism rather than blanket condemnations...

Democracy Is Hard

CSM is running a story about a shift in public opinion regarding democracy in Latin America. Disappointed by decades of poor performance from their major parties many Latin American voters are electing populist outsiders, who unfortunately are also struggling to bring improvement. Democracy is a difficult form of government. We've discussed this here before, but it bears repeating. It becomes particularly difficult if you lack stable civic institutions, a substantial economic middle class, and sound economic policies. Latin American nations suffer on all accounts. Their experience has not been so different from those of other fledgling democracies in Africa and South-east Asia. Even the former Soviet states, which are relatively better off in those regards, have struggled with democracy. This is the backdrop in which the US invasion of Iraq needs to be considered. The idea that we could simply remove Saddam Hussein and then Iraq would transform into a shining beacon of freedom and democracy in the Middle East was absurd from day 1. I think people in the US are slowly beginning to realize this.

Brazil--The Next Member of the "Axis of Evil"?

The Washington Post breaks this story discussing Brazil's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into uranium enrichment facilities in that country. As the WP reporter observes, Brazil's conduct "poses a conundrum for President Bush, who has called for tighter restrictions on the enrichment of uranium, even for nuclear power, as part of a new strategy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." The story also hints that Brazil might have some connection with A.Q. Khan's black market.

I wonder how the Bush administration will respond. If Bush and the UN treat Brazil differently than Iran and North Korea, those "rogue nations" will have good reason to argue that a double-standard exists. If Bush responds with threats, Brazil may very well brush them off, knowing that the United States is already spread too thin to do anything (and who among Americans would support a war against Brazil anyway?) and everyone knows that the U.N. has no teeth of its own.

Of course, one must not forget where Brazil stands on the war in Iraq--it is not among the coalition partners (see relatively current list here), and that factor alone puts them in the "against us" camp. There are several interesting dynamics at work and I for one am interested to see what unfolds.

Update: Apparently covert operations against Brazil have already begun--see this CNN report for more details.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

A few points...

Barry, I think we are focusing on different elements of the statement I quoted from the article (which I can only assume is an accurate assessment of Montequieu's position). You noted that it is expectation that drives revolution. I noted that "the people" need to be prodded along by reforms originating, presumably, from somewhere other than "the people". The latter statement is very much in keeping with Orwell's themes.

On the points you both posted regarding hierarchy of needs and individual empowerment, I would tend to favor Ryan's position. Unless I'm mistaken, most of the peasantry was dirt poor in both the Russian and French revolutions. The role of reform, I think, in inspiring revolution was not so much that it lifted the peasants to a more secure lifestyle, but that it gave them courage question and oppose their governments.

Regarding wealth and materialism, I would definitely favor Frank's position. In countries of great wealth (think Japan and the US), materialism is enshrined rather than reduced. In fact, this is something I wish that Putnam might have studied as a factor in community involvement. I can think of a lot of annecdotal evidence that wealth is tied to a greater focus on personal attainment, where poverty creates more focus on community support. I don't, however, have any great evidence to back that up. It also tends to run contrary to my general feeling that Orwell's assessments are correct.

Also, and this could almost be separate (but related) topic, I was doing some reading in the "Market For Civil War" article in the same FP Magazine which looks at the financial causes of civil war. I was not impressed. First, they bounce back and forth between issues of absolute wealth and relative wealth without distinguishing between the two at all. Also much of their evidence was rather specious.

They pointed out that once a nation reaches a high per capita, the "risk of revolution is negligible". Of course, all the countries they seem to be referring to in that category are liberal democracies. Might that have a something to do with it? The Soviet Union faced economic hardship, but it was still relatively well off when it suffered a massive (albeit bloodless) revolution.

Similarly they supposed that wealth distribution was not a major factor, presenting as evidence that while Columbia suffered for that cause, Brazil "got away" with it. I'd say if 50% of countries with a high inequality of wealth suffer civil wars, that would make it a pretty major factor. Further that, as I mentioned recently to Barry, the other South American countries, including Brazil, that haven't seen recent revolutions are not out of the woods yet. They are facing severe problems with their democratic governments as progressive leadership is elected by the masses and has to go head to head with a small, but incredibly powerful upper class that has heretofore dominated the political system. Argentina has been hovering on the brink of total collapse for some time now, Venzuela just recently stepped back from the edge of civil war, and Brazil is now facing their first such challenge by a progressive government to the entrenched power of the wealthy. The verdict is certainly not in as to whether these democracies will survive their disparities of wealth.

For this very reason, however, I do support the authors' contention that democracy holds no promise of political stability for developing nations. I have serious doubts as to how well democracy can survive in this nation as the disparity of wealth grows. In most developing nations the situation is much worse. I continue to believe that having a large and healthy middle class is a crucial element to a strong democracy. Additionally, it has long been my contention that there needs to be a high level of social and cultural buy-in for democracy to succeed. Democracy is a fragile form of government which offers opportunities for corruption and subversion at every turn. Most developing nations are just not there yet. And this is a major difference of opinion between myself and these authors who completely dismiss the role of culture and historical background in civil war.

But I also have some agreement with the conclusions of the article. One of the elements they stress is the role of international peacekeepers. This I could not agree with more. I think that more than anything we need to buy time for these nations and provide them with the stability they need to grow the cultural, economic and educational infrastructure they need to create a stable government. And to otherwise get out of their way and let them do it. Some lessons can only be learned by experience...

I keep coming back to Iran. I just wish we could have seen what would have happened to them had the whole axis of evil thing never occurred. They had just the incremental reforms and high expectations we've been talking about. They've completely rejected foreign influence for 20 years and at the same time toppled the old aristocracy, and have come around to democracy on their own terms. They have a strong sense of national identity, unity, and pride. And even the newly entrenched powers were recognizing the need to change and liberalise. These are precisely the conditions that I would view ideal for the creation of a healthy and stable democracy. I couldn't write a better script. Unfortunately, by continuously rattling our sabre at Iran and praising the reformers we are tainting them with the perception of being American agents. This in a country that topped out Foreign Policy's chart (same issue) of popular nationalism and that is rabidly anti-colonialist.

And what a powerful example they could have been to the developing world. To demonstrate that nationalism and indepence from the colonial powers, the liberal democracies, is not, in fact, incompatible with the development of one's own liberal democracy. The neo-cons have been hoping that in Iraq they could create a shining example democracy for the middle east. That could have been, should have been, Iran. How much more powerful a demonstration would it have been to show them that they could get where they need to go without having to capitulate to the hated imperialists...