In considering the "fighting them there so they won't come here" argument, Matthew Yglesias points out the obvious conflict between symbolism (retreating from Iraq makes us look weak) and reality (staying in Iraq causes us to actually be weak). He seems perplexed by the Right's tendency to "view national security policy as something that takes place entirely at the level of symbolism". This is, I think, not so difficult to understand. American conservatives live in an alternate reality, unable to distinguish between symbolism and reality. To them, symbolism is reality. If you listened to enough conservative radio and watched enough Fox News you'd live in that alternate reality too. Never was this more clearly illustrated than in Ron Suskind's famous discussion with an undisclosed White House official (Andrew Card, perhaps?) about how the Bush administration was in a constant process of creating its own reality. This was never a matter of the Bush administration being able to fundamentally alter the state of the world directly through their pronouncements and news releases, but rather an expression of the belief that if they can control news cycles and assert a concept of reality strenuously enough, everyone else would have little choice but to accept it as real, and the world would adjust itself to the White House's vision. It was Wag the Dog transformed from satire into official state policy. They could reshape reality through symbolism by convincing people that what they thought was true actually wasn't.
Obviously this doesn't work. There are too many competing sources of news and reality does eventually trickle in to displace this fictional presentation. The reality-based community inevitably gets the last laugh, as Suskind pointed out. This is why the administration and their supporters were always so furious about the media reporting on bloodshed in Iraq and missing the "good stories"; the media was deconstructing the administration's carefully constructed alternate reality.
But it's not hard to see why conservatives got suckered into this belief, and why they still can't seem to let go of it. Most conservative news sources are mere propaganda outlets. Witness the old Pew study finding that the more people watched Fox News the more likely they were to believe that we had found WMD's in Iraq or that Saddam was behind 9/11. Or this more recent Pew study that shows that while liberals see Republican presidential candidates in exactly the same way conservatives themselves view them, conservatives, by contrast, see all of the Democratic candidates as raving left-wing lunatics. American conservatives have replaced their own reality with symbolism, so why wouldn't it be natural for them to think the same is true for everyone else? Their own echo-chamber media has relegated them to a world that only exists in their own minds.
Showing posts with label Ron Suskind. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ron Suskind. Show all posts
Saturday, May 26, 2007
Wednesday, August 09, 2006
Constructing a Salable Security Narrative
Israeli activist and negotiator Daniel Levy has an article in Ha'aretz wondering whether and how Israel can extract itself from a "pro-Israel" US foreign policy that appears fixed on using Israel to fight its proxy wars. The neocon foreign policy, he argues, has inflamed opinion against Israel even as it has eliminated any ability for the US to buffer Israel from hostility. As Levy notes:
In the end Levy struggles with the same thing I struggle with, and that a post-Lieberman Democratic party is struggling with: how do you create an alternative narrative where peace and security are achieved with negotiations and painstaking diplomacy rather than bombs and missiles? As Levy notes, the neocon vision glosses over the complexities of local politics, the weighty and difficult to deal with matters of context. The neocon narrative is simple, pristine, and, above all, masculine. Like a good Bruckheimer protaganist, the neocon philosophy brooks no bullshit. It kicks ass and takes names. This, as Ron Suskind expertly points out in his talks and writing, is how the Bush political machine sells. The constituency of people tired of the overwhelming complexity of the modern world is vast, and furiously angry. Ultimately, however, policies born of oversimplification are doomed to disaster. Time enough has passed on the neocon experiment for that to begin to show, although the public has not yet begun to grasp the immensity of this disaster. The resulting dissatisfaction may be enough to turn the tide to a small degree, as the Connecticut primary showed. By a very slim margin.
As many Republican partisans have argued (and I think they're right), rejectionism is not enough to build a political movement. There must be an alternative narrative. But how do you sell complexity in a political system built around 10-second soundbites? How do you get a time-starved public with quick-hit media and short attention spans to engage in the labyrinthine terrain of Lebanese politics? I think a lot about this lately, and as yet I am unconvinced that it is possible. Hopefully there is someone out there in the wide world of politics who can prove me wrong.
An America that seeks to reshape the region through an unsophisticated mixture of bombs and ballots, devoid of local contextual understanding, alliance-building or redressing of grievances, ultimately undermines both itself and Israel. The sight this week of Secretary of State Rice homeward bound, unable to touch down in any Arab capital, should have a sobering effect in Washington and Jerusalem.It should, but will it?
In the end Levy struggles with the same thing I struggle with, and that a post-Lieberman Democratic party is struggling with: how do you create an alternative narrative where peace and security are achieved with negotiations and painstaking diplomacy rather than bombs and missiles? As Levy notes, the neocon vision glosses over the complexities of local politics, the weighty and difficult to deal with matters of context. The neocon narrative is simple, pristine, and, above all, masculine. Like a good Bruckheimer protaganist, the neocon philosophy brooks no bullshit. It kicks ass and takes names. This, as Ron Suskind expertly points out in his talks and writing, is how the Bush political machine sells. The constituency of people tired of the overwhelming complexity of the modern world is vast, and furiously angry. Ultimately, however, policies born of oversimplification are doomed to disaster. Time enough has passed on the neocon experiment for that to begin to show, although the public has not yet begun to grasp the immensity of this disaster. The resulting dissatisfaction may be enough to turn the tide to a small degree, as the Connecticut primary showed. By a very slim margin.
As many Republican partisans have argued (and I think they're right), rejectionism is not enough to build a political movement. There must be an alternative narrative. But how do you sell complexity in a political system built around 10-second soundbites? How do you get a time-starved public with quick-hit media and short attention spans to engage in the labyrinthine terrain of Lebanese politics? I think a lot about this lately, and as yet I am unconvinced that it is possible. Hopefully there is someone out there in the wide world of politics who can prove me wrong.
Tuesday, August 01, 2006
Corruption Watch: University Funding
Just a few quick hits today:
CSM has a strong article on the politicization of federal educational and research funding. It's just one more arena for compromised politicians to extend their tentacles into. Remember when Newt Gingrich built a Republican majority around the idea of clean government?
On to Lebanon. It seems that a small coalition of moderate-conservative realists is coalescing around the Andrew Sullivan blog. These include the Cunning Realist, Dan Drezner, and the Belgravia Dispatch. That last, the Belgravia Dispatch, is the source of the single best piece I've seen on Lebanon so far. Key point:
...this was more by way of an ill-advised temper tantrum than a serious military operation, as Arik Sharon would himself admit, if only he were aware of the disaster underway. Sharon would have recalled previous Lebanese quagmires and would have well understood (aided by the wisdom of years and the lack of any need to prove himself) that resort to airpower, in the main, cannot succeed in this context, with the specter of hundreds and hundreds of civilian deaths earning Israel international opprobrium in every world capital (save Washington), and that there is no real, sustained post-'82 appetite in Israel for a massive land incursion regardless, not least given the ultimate futility of same. No, Sharon would likely have chastised Ehud Olmert for his impestuous over-reaction, one so helpfully fanned on by myopic strategic blunderers and amateurs in Washington, both in policy and journalistic circles.
Also, here's a link to Ron Suskind's latest Miller Center appearance. He was there in late June speaking about the One Percent Doctrine. As always he was animated, entertaining, and insightful. He at moments comes off a little bit arrogant, a little pushy, and has the feel of a televangelist. But in general there probably isn't a more captivating speaker on politics and the Bush administration. I've gone back to the video of his last Miller Center speech several times, and I'm sure I'll come back to this one too.
And finally, this is a bit odd for TBWJ, but I thought I'd post a link to this TV ad. Yes it's for Dow Chemical, yes Dow is probably still evil. But it's some of the prettiest photography I've seen in any sort of video, much less a commercial. It plays sometimes before the PBS Newshour, and I can't recall the last time I was so riveted by a TV ad.
CSM has a strong article on the politicization of federal educational and research funding. It's just one more arena for compromised politicians to extend their tentacles into. Remember when Newt Gingrich built a Republican majority around the idea of clean government?
On to Lebanon. It seems that a small coalition of moderate-conservative realists is coalescing around the Andrew Sullivan blog. These include the Cunning Realist, Dan Drezner, and the Belgravia Dispatch. That last, the Belgravia Dispatch, is the source of the single best piece I've seen on Lebanon so far. Key point:
...this was more by way of an ill-advised temper tantrum than a serious military operation, as Arik Sharon would himself admit, if only he were aware of the disaster underway. Sharon would have recalled previous Lebanese quagmires and would have well understood (aided by the wisdom of years and the lack of any need to prove himself) that resort to airpower, in the main, cannot succeed in this context, with the specter of hundreds and hundreds of civilian deaths earning Israel international opprobrium in every world capital (save Washington), and that there is no real, sustained post-'82 appetite in Israel for a massive land incursion regardless, not least given the ultimate futility of same. No, Sharon would likely have chastised Ehud Olmert for his impestuous over-reaction, one so helpfully fanned on by myopic strategic blunderers and amateurs in Washington, both in policy and journalistic circles.
Also, here's a link to Ron Suskind's latest Miller Center appearance. He was there in late June speaking about the One Percent Doctrine. As always he was animated, entertaining, and insightful. He at moments comes off a little bit arrogant, a little pushy, and has the feel of a televangelist. But in general there probably isn't a more captivating speaker on politics and the Bush administration. I've gone back to the video of his last Miller Center speech several times, and I'm sure I'll come back to this one too.
And finally, this is a bit odd for TBWJ, but I thought I'd post a link to this TV ad. Yes it's for Dow Chemical, yes Dow is probably still evil. But it's some of the prettiest photography I've seen in any sort of video, much less a commercial. It plays sometimes before the PBS Newshour, and I can't recall the last time I was so riveted by a TV ad.
Thursday, January 27, 2005
Close Encounters With the Bush Administration
Last night Ron Suskind (who is a UVA grad) came to Charlottesville and spoke at the Miller Center. There is a Real video of it on the Miller Center web site. It was a packed house (there are a couple of other rooms beside what you see on the film where we were watching on a closed circuit TV). Suskind put on a brilliant performance and detailed his whole experience with the administration, from the time he got an office in the White House for his Karen Hughes story, to his story on John DiIulio (the Mayberry Machiavellis story), to, of course, the book with Paul O'Neill. He is quite an orator and I highly recommend the video, and if you get a chance to see him, I'd highly encourage you to do so.
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
Bush Intelligence and Policy Strategy: Close Your Eyes and Plug Your Nose
I just finished reading Ron Suskind's book, The Price of Loyalty, and I found it to be a very worthwhile read (and Dave clued me in that today, Terry Gross interviewed Suskind and O'Neill on Fresh Air--the show is available online). Unfortunately, I think the media has seized on a few glib comments that O'Neill made (and regrets ever uttering) and all but ignores what I find the most disturbing yet unsurprising charge--the theme throughout the Bush administration that policy controls politics, not the other way around. O'Neill states that he had grown accustomed to a deliberative process in the other presidential administrations in which he served, and was shocked and dismayed to learn that the current White House took an entirely different tack. O'Neill claims that he, along with Colin Powell and Christie Todd Whitman, were stranded among a group of partisans who had no interest in advancing debate but rather sought only to advance political objectives. This modus operandi was applied in all areas of "policymaking," but the areas on which O'Neill provided the greatest detail are Iraq and Bush's monolithic budget strategy--cutting taxes.
An October 2003 New Yorker article that I stumbled across supports O'Neill's observations, at least with regard to Iraq. It describes a process known in the intelligence world as "stovepiping"--passing along sensitive intelligence or requests for action up the chain of command without first subjecting the information to rigorous scrutiny. The whole point of the intelligence structure was "to prevent raw intelligence from getting to people who would be misled," according to Greg Thielmann, formerly an expert with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Yet the current administration entirely abandoned the process, according to Thielmann and confirmed by one of his colleagues, John Bolton, currently the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control. The article quotes Bolton as stating, "I found that there was lots of stuff that I wasn't getting and that the INR analysts weren't including .... I didn't want it filtered. I wanted to see everything--to be fully informed. If that puts someone's nose out of joint, sorry about that." The article continues with a great exposition regarding Iraq's purported attempts to purchase of Nigerian uranium, and other intelligence failures. It also reminds readers of a few sobering quotes from Vice President Cheney that are a far cry from the message they are currently selling. For instance:
August 7, 2002--What we know now from various sources is that he has continued to improve, if you can put it in those terms, the capabilities of his chemical and biological agents, and he continues to pursue a nuclear weapon. He sits on top of 10 percent of the world's oil reserves. He has enormous wealth being generated by that. And left to his own devices, it's the judgment of many of us that in the not to distant future he will acquire nuclear weapons. And a nuclear armed Saddam Hussein is not a pleasant prospect, I don't think, for anyone in the region or anyone in the world, for that matter. (Online NewsHour has a transcript and video at this link.)
September 14, 2002--We do know with absolute certainty that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapons.... (The Department of State provides this press release.)
I highly recommend you all take the time to read this article. (Bill Moyers interviewed Thielmann on NOW with Bill Moyers back in June 2003 on the same topic, and the transcript also makes for interesting reading.)
MSNBC/Newsweek provides some additional ammo on the "stovepiping" of information, in this article from December 15, 2003, discussing a memo sent by a member of the Iraqi National Congress to a Congressional Committee. The memo apparently confirms that raw data was sent from the INC directly to Cheney's staff--without any opportunity for the intelligence community to review and analyze the data for its veracity. As the Newsweek article observes (and the New Yorker article concurs), much of the information provided by the INC was highly unreliable and has since been proven false.
An October 2003 New Yorker article that I stumbled across supports O'Neill's observations, at least with regard to Iraq. It describes a process known in the intelligence world as "stovepiping"--passing along sensitive intelligence or requests for action up the chain of command without first subjecting the information to rigorous scrutiny. The whole point of the intelligence structure was "to prevent raw intelligence from getting to people who would be misled," according to Greg Thielmann, formerly an expert with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Yet the current administration entirely abandoned the process, according to Thielmann and confirmed by one of his colleagues, John Bolton, currently the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control. The article quotes Bolton as stating, "I found that there was lots of stuff that I wasn't getting and that the INR analysts weren't including .... I didn't want it filtered. I wanted to see everything--to be fully informed. If that puts someone's nose out of joint, sorry about that." The article continues with a great exposition regarding Iraq's purported attempts to purchase of Nigerian uranium, and other intelligence failures. It also reminds readers of a few sobering quotes from Vice President Cheney that are a far cry from the message they are currently selling. For instance:
August 7, 2002--What we know now from various sources is that he has continued to improve, if you can put it in those terms, the capabilities of his chemical and biological agents, and he continues to pursue a nuclear weapon. He sits on top of 10 percent of the world's oil reserves. He has enormous wealth being generated by that. And left to his own devices, it's the judgment of many of us that in the not to distant future he will acquire nuclear weapons. And a nuclear armed Saddam Hussein is not a pleasant prospect, I don't think, for anyone in the region or anyone in the world, for that matter. (Online NewsHour has a transcript and video at this link.)
September 14, 2002--We do know with absolute certainty that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapons.... (The Department of State provides this press release.)
I highly recommend you all take the time to read this article. (Bill Moyers interviewed Thielmann on NOW with Bill Moyers back in June 2003 on the same topic, and the transcript also makes for interesting reading.)
MSNBC/Newsweek provides some additional ammo on the "stovepiping" of information, in this article from December 15, 2003, discussing a memo sent by a member of the Iraqi National Congress to a Congressional Committee. The memo apparently confirms that raw data was sent from the INC directly to Cheney's staff--without any opportunity for the intelligence community to review and analyze the data for its veracity. As the Newsweek article observes (and the New Yorker article concurs), much of the information provided by the INC was highly unreliable and has since been proven false.
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