A Sane Iran Policy

Jacob Weisberg (with an assist from Ken Pollack) breaks down the US strategic policy towards Iran. Weisberg notes that our aggressive saber-rattling will have the same effect in Iran as it has had in so many other places around the globe: to entrench the very regime we hoped to unseat.

Such belligerence seems unlikely to produce the result we desire for a variety of reasons. For one, our bluster is essentially empty. The United States lacks plausible military options for taking out Iran's nuclear program and dealing with the potential reaction, especially now that we are bogged down in Iraq. It is also proving extremely difficult to get the rest of the world to go along with the kind of comprehensive sanctions that would bite. Meanwhile, America's hostility is supplying Ahmadinejad with an external demon for his propaganda and helping him cover over his domestic failures. This American push for futile sanctions follows a familiar pattern, extending from Cuba to Burma to North Korea to pre-invasion Iraq—places where economic isolation and threats have fueled not regime change but regime stabilization.

On the other hand, it is difficult for the US to support human rights and democracy advocates, because a) they tend to say a lot of bad things about us and b) the Bush administration is too toxic for any Iranians to want to be associated with it:

The president, who has managed to make democracy a dirty word in many parts of the world, may by now retain only the ability to taint liberal heroes with guilt by association. Last summer, Iran's other leading dissident, Akbar Ganji, declined to meet White House officials when visiting Washington, saying—with reference to both Iraq and Iran—that "you cannot bring democracy to a country by attacking it."

Weisberg believes that, if the US let him, Mohamed ElBaradei could pour cold water on the situation and maneuver the parties to a negotiating table, where the US could simultaneously make progress on the nuclear weapons issue and undercut Amedinejad domestically. It's worth a shot...

Kerry and Khatami at Davos

Andrew Sullivan linked approvingly to this blog post ripping into John Kerry for making comments critical of the Bush administration at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in the presence of (gasp!) Mohammad Khatami, former president of Iran. That disturbed me, so I sent him this email:

Mr. Sullivan,

I would be interested to read an explanation for your approving link to Hot Air's blog post ripping John Kerry for his comments at Davos. His comments seemed fairly reasonable; we have consistently burned our diplomatic bridges whether the topic was Iraq, global warming, the International Criminal Court, land mines, nuclear weapons, capital punishment, or torture. And we are facing a crisis of confidence and international isolation. We have been, as Kerry said, diplomatically tone deaf, and it has hurt us badly. I think Kerry is hardly wrong in voicing these concerns. For the most part, they don't seem terribly contrary to comments you yourself have made.

Is the crime merely that he voiced these opinions in the presence of Mohammad Khatami (or "the pig" as Hot Air refers to him)? Should our policy discussion be stifled whenever a Muslim might be listening? Should we imagine that none can see our network news, or read our newspapers or (heaven forbid) your blog? Hot Air suggests that "Khatami's masters" will thrill at these comments critical of the Bush administration. I thought you had disowned the idea that dissent gives aid and comfort to our foes. Isn't frank and open discussion part and parcel of deliberative democracy, even when others are listening? It's not as if they didn't hear all of this from Kerry in 2004 (and having heard it, Iran famously endorsed George W. Bush in the general election -- so much for being thrilled by Kerry's rhetoric).

Furthermore, I'm not certain that vilification of Khatami is terribly useful. Many responsible statesmen have suggested that engaging Iran in a regional dialogue would be to our benefit. Who do we think that dialogue will be with? We may not agree with Khatami across a broad array of issues (and certainly I agree his policies on homosexuality were abhorrent), but is Ahmadinejad better? Is Khamenei? Within the spectrum of politics in Iran, we might not do much better than Khatami. He at least pushed in directions we favored on democracy, on foreign relations, on the rule of law. If we wait to find someone who agrees with us on everything before even engaging in dialogue, then we'll wait (as the Bush administration has) for something that will never happen. Iran is not Iowa, and it is not going to become Iowa simply because we refuse to talk to them. If politics is, as Otto Van Bismarck stated, the art of the possible, we should realize that moderates like Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani are our most likely allies in Iran. That doesn't mean we have to agree with them or even treat them as friends, but gratuitous demonization is not going to further our dialogue.

Whipping Up a Frenzy

This is a brief follow-up to my point on threatening Iran. Mark Bowden (of whom I'm a big fan) has a NYT column how the Iranian conservatives are using the nuclear weapons conflict to generate support and stifle dissent. And we've played right into their hand...

People Don't Like Being Threatened

It seems like I've written about this same issue many times before in the contexts of both Iran and Israel-Palestine. It is also largely applicable to Iraq. People in a country (or in any other context, for example a family) may have their differences. They may not like each other. They may want to see change. But you do not capitalize on those differences by threatening them. The only thing that will do is bring them together in unity against you. Of all the stupid things I've heard and read about the possibility of military action against Iran, the most irritatingly stupid has been the oft-repeated idea that the young people in Iran don't like the conservative clergy who run the country and will therefore welcome an invasion or, in the face of Western pressure, will overthrow the government. My god, have we not heard this before?

The Iranian clergy had real reason to worry about their future position after the 1998 election, and consequently they allowed some moderation in policies that they otherwise would not have. Our constant belligerence towards Iran since 2001 has put an end to that and has seen a moderate president Khatami replaced by an extremist Ahmadinejad, and talks of reform replaced by talks of nuclear weapons.

When Khatami won the 1998 election, the Clinton administration, after much deliberation, decided that the proper response was to do nothing. Any action taken in support of the reformists would only have served to taint them with the appearance of Western influence. It was a fight that belonged to the Iranian people, and one where the side we favored had a good chance of success. Patience was the proper course.

That opportunity for internal reform in Iran has now been squandered, and reformists will need years to recover. I can't say whether we can afford to wait years for them. But I can say with some confidence that we can choose to either maintain an aggressive posture (as is the present course) or hope for internal reform in Iran. There is no option that will allow both. We are rallying reformists and conservatives alike to the flag. If we back off and hope for reform, there is no guarantee that Iran won't get the bomb. In fact, Iran probably will. But if they really liberalize, and I think they might, even with the bomb, that is a far better outcome and a more permanent solution than will ever be achieved through an aggressive approach.

Don't Be Stupid (Again)

James Fallows had another great article in The Atlantic, this time on potential military action against Iran. It's short and to the point, and, I think, well-argued. The bit about oil leverage was insightful, particularly in explaining the reluctance of the EU to push for strong sanctions.

Playing Hardball With India

This is just a follow-up to the previous story about the US pressuring India over Iran. This report goes into a bit more depth on the relationship between the US and India vis a vis this nuclear treaty. Now, of course, Indian leaders are stuck with the problem of trying to look like they weren't cowed by the US if and when they do give in on this issue. I don't understand how this administration has failed to learn, after all this time, that when you want someone to alter their policy you need to leave room for them to change course gracefully. If you present it as a stark choice between the US and the people who voted them into office, they're not going to choose the US...

Nuclear Politics

India is apparently not very happy with the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear policy. I don't know a whole lot about South Asian politics (and apparently neither does the State Department), but I find this to be interesting. It seems that India and Iran are getting on pretty well. One suspects that China may also want to make friends with Iran, as Iran is in need of friends these days, and China could use some oil partners who aren't too far under the sway of the U.S. Russia has also had good relations with Iran, as they've been the ones setting up the Iranian nuclear program. If these guys are willing to back Iran at the U.N., that's a pretty formidable coalition, one that the U.S. and Europe may have a hard time overcoming. This could be very interesting.

A Rival to NATO?

There's an article on CSM about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a military alliance potentially involving China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the various -stans. It's an interesting idea, but do these countries have anything in common other than an interest in increasing their influence? It would be an extremely potent group, one that probably could rival NATO in power in coming decades, but I have a hard time seeing any coherent policies or positions that these nations could all agree on.

Realpolitik Hypocrisy?

In a Washington Post column, neocon Bob Kagan attacks liberals for hypocritically casting doubt on the newly elected Iraqi government. How, he asks, can liberals hold that the U.S. wrongly coddled politically convenient dictators during the Cold War, yet be critical of the democratically elected government that has replaced Saddam Hussein? Are liberals prejudiced against Shiites?

The response, I think, needs to address a number of points. First, is that criticism of the realpolitik approach that led the U.S. to overthrow democracies and train death squads comes with limits. Critics, as far as I know, never advocated that the U.S. should invade any country that doesn't meet Western democratic standards. The criticism was, and remains, that we should not allow short-term political convenience to overshadow our commitment to freedom and democracy. This is generally not a belligerent, hawkish group of people. They have advocated working within the international diplomatic and economic framework to advance our ideals and values.

The Bush administration stands as guilty as any Cold War administration in this regard. We invaded Afghanistan, not to promote democracy, but to take out Al Qaeda, and Iraq to secure Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile the U.S. has deepened its ties with numerous anti-democratic human rights violators all across the Middle East and Central, South, and South-East Asia. Bush's inaugural address notwithstanding, there has been no great commitment to democratic ideals by this administration.

Kagan's apparent response is that even if liberals would not have advocated invasion, shouldn't they celebrate the advances of democracy there? But, while the liberals we're talking about are critics of realpolitik, I think they are not critics of political realism. They don't advocate abandoning empirical analysis, but rather a shift in priorities and methods in pursuing American foreign policy objectives. As such they are rightly worried about the course of events in Iraq.

It requires no prejudice to be concerned about what will happen when the Shiite controlled government takes power. From my perspective, it is not any peculiar qualities of Shiites that worries me, but rather that they suffer from all of the usual weaknesses and frailties common to mankind. The Baathist purges of Shiites aside, the Sunni militants have consistently targeted Shiites in violent attacks since the occupation started (here are . a couple just from the past week). They have declined to retaliate largely due to the calls for restraint from the Ayatollah al Sistani, the same man who has driven the timetables both for the hand-over of sovereignty and the recent elections. Are we to think they harbor no animosity towards Sunnis, no desire for vengeance? Are these angels in the form of men? Or have they been playing hard-ball, waiting (and pushing the process foward) for their demographic advantage to inevitably deliver the power of government to them. What happens when they gain control of the machinery of state? How will a Shiite-controlled military respond to Sunni attacks against Shiite targets? Will the response be measured, moderate, and proportional? And when the Shiite-controlled military crosses the line, how will the Sunni population in the country respond? The threat of all-out civil war is very real and frightening. What then for democracy in the Middle East?

Neither does one have to view the Shiites as Iranian stooges to be concerned about Iraq's relationship with Iran, now more so than ever. While I don't share the loathing of Iran held by many in this country, the newly announced alliance between Iran and Syria, following shortly after the election of a pro-Iran government in Iraq could drastically change the balance of power in the Middle East. If the new Iraqi government throws in their lot with Iran and Syria, Iran will have taken a major step up as a regional power and the U.S. will be left scrambling to try and pick up the pieces. Again, rejecting realpolitik does not mean rejecting political reality. And the political reality here is that the occupation of Iraq seems to be producing many undesirable results. There is little cause for rejoicing here, for liberals or anyone else.

David Kay: Here We Go Again

In the Washington Post, former top weapons inspector in Iraq David Kay writes that the current posture towards Iran looks strikingly similar to the path we travelled to Iraq. Kay urges that we apply the lessons learned in Iraq, and gives a good accounting of a number of those lessons. Acknowledging mistakes and attempting to learn from them seems to be a rare and noteworthy act in the modern political environment...

Iranians: Evil, or Smart?

Richard Cohen has a brilliant column on Iran's quest for nukes in the Washington Post. When I say brilliant, what I mean is that he writes what I've been saying since IAEA first started to be concerned about Iran's nuclear facilities :). From Iran's perspective it's the obvious and rational thing to do...

A Foregone Conclusion

George Will has a surprisingly good column in the Washington Post essentially acknowledging what everybody else knows and doesn't want to say: Iran is going to go nuclear, and there's not a thing that anyone can do about it. Extra points for pointing out that the occupation of Iraq both motivates Iran and ties our hands from taking any action.

I've Got a Good Idea: Let's Invade Iran!

No cookie for Charles Krauthammer, who is clearly as retarded as ever. In his Washington Post column about Iran today Krauthammer makes the very good points that a) invading Iran would be an order of magnitude more difficult than it was to invade Iraq and b) Iran is a country ripe for revolution. His conclusion from these two points? Naturally, we need to invade, and thankfully our occupation of Iraq will just make it that much easier. Nevermind that our occupation of Iraq has overextended our budget and our military manpower to dangerous levels. And what he also doesn't discuss is the difference in occupying the two nations. If we're enjoying our occupation of Iraq, just wait until we get into a country with more people who hate the US more and have a stronger sense of national identity. Oh boy, that'll be fun.

The IAEA Gets Serious With Israel

In a great editorial today, CSM supports Mohamed ElBaradei's shot across Israel's bow over their nuclear arsenal. ElBaradei, director of the IAEA, during a visit to Jerusalem this week warned Israel that their nuclear weapons are damaging the credibility of his agency in trying to deal with Iran. CSM makes the case that it is unlikely that Iran will abandon their pursuit of a nuclear deterrent without Israel agreeing to eliminate their arsenal as well. They further argue that if Iran were to succeed in gaining an arsenal it would discredit the IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would likely lead to further nuclear destabilization.

Iran and Sadr

CSM has a great writeup of Iran's intervention with Sadr. It's clear that the CPA was none too enthusiastic about Iran getting involved. That may have tied Iran's hands as far as working out a deal...

Crap--Spoke Too Soon

I don't know whether this bit of news will necessarily unravel everything about the peace deal, but it may very well cause the Iranian delegation to withdraw. Just when things start looking up...

Oh, yeah? Make Me!

Preliminary reaction from Iran on the IAEA resolution: Iran plans to scale back their current level of cooperation with the IAEA. There is some possibility they'll drop the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entirely. No particular surprises here.

Iran On the Brink

Well, we're all over CSM's stories today. As you know I've been taken with quite a fascination of Iran for some time. They've been in the news quite a bit recently as the Bush administration has successfully pushed through an IAEA resolution calling for Iran to give a full disclosure of their nuclear program by Oct. 31. Or else. This is a huge turning point for Iran. CSM ran a very nice story summarizing the situation today. My gut feeling is that they'll tell the IAEA to take a hike. I think they have the feeling, now more than ever, that they need to have a nuclear deterrent. They know that if George W. Bush gets reelected as President, there is a very real chance that the US will invade their country. Further, with Iraq gone, I think they see an opportunity to become the key strategic power in the Middle-East, and to play a leadership role amongst the Muslim nations.

They also know that there will never be a better time to move on their weapons program than the present. The US is completely tied down with Iraq. The budget and the military have been pushed to the limit. And to make things even more opportune, North Korea is playing the same game. If both nations flout the nuclear non-proliferation treaty certainly the US cannot afford to go to war with them both. Basically, if Iran can have a functional weapon ready within the next year or two, they will never have a better opportunity than they do now.

I do not believe that international censure or sanctions will move them too much either. They have spent the better part of the last 25 years being despised by the West, and their recent efforts to make friends have largely been rebuffed due to this terrorism flap. The biggest remaining threat is Israel. There is no love lost between the two nations, and frankly I think Iran enjoys antagonizing Israel with their weapons program. They will need to be careful to ensure that their nuclear program is not so easily destroyed as Iraq's twenty years ago.

The underlying problem here is that any nations not closely aligned with the US are starting to feel very insecure. This is a stated goal of the administration's aggressive national security plan. To let the Evildoers know that nobody is safe. But the Evildoers know better than that. Anyone can be safe if they have enough nuclear weapons. The Evildoers also know that the US has a limited capacity to intervene in their weapons programs. As such nuclear proliferation becomes an extremely attractive option to any nation concerned about being labeled an Evildoer. Perhaps the administration did not really think through what it would mean for the world to become a more aggressive and belligerent place.

Article: Paging Oliver North

In the past 24 hours both Condi Rice and George Bush have fully dumped responsibility for the uranium gaffe on the CIA. Now they just need to find some party loyalist within the CIA to fall on his sword for this and they'll have cleared that hurdle. This should not prove too difficult given that the CIA is still claiming that those trucks were bio-warfare labs despite findings by other British and US government officials that the trucks were most likely used to pump weather balloons. Bush is all lacquered up in his teflon coating.

And here's your regularly scheduled episode of "The Iranian People Want A Liberal Democracy".

Update: Ask and ye shall receive. George Tenet accepts blame for the uranium mess.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Threshold

A few points...

Barry, I think we are focusing on different elements of the statement I quoted from the article (which I can only assume is an accurate assessment of Montequieu's position). You noted that it is expectation that drives revolution. I noted that "the people" need to be prodded along by reforms originating, presumably, from somewhere other than "the people". The latter statement is very much in keeping with Orwell's themes.

On the points you both posted regarding hierarchy of needs and individual empowerment, I would tend to favor Ryan's position. Unless I'm mistaken, most of the peasantry was dirt poor in both the Russian and French revolutions. The role of reform, I think, in inspiring revolution was not so much that it lifted the peasants to a more secure lifestyle, but that it gave them courage question and oppose their governments.

Regarding wealth and materialism, I would definitely favor Frank's position. In countries of great wealth (think Japan and the US), materialism is enshrined rather than reduced. In fact, this is something I wish that Putnam might have studied as a factor in community involvement. I can think of a lot of annecdotal evidence that wealth is tied to a greater focus on personal attainment, where poverty creates more focus on community support. I don't, however, have any great evidence to back that up. It also tends to run contrary to my general feeling that Orwell's assessments are correct.

Also, and this could almost be separate (but related) topic, I was doing some reading in the "Market For Civil War" article in the same FP Magazine which looks at the financial causes of civil war. I was not impressed. First, they bounce back and forth between issues of absolute wealth and relative wealth without distinguishing between the two at all. Also much of their evidence was rather specious.

They pointed out that once a nation reaches a high per capita, the "risk of revolution is negligible". Of course, all the countries they seem to be referring to in that category are liberal democracies. Might that have a something to do with it? The Soviet Union faced economic hardship, but it was still relatively well off when it suffered a massive (albeit bloodless) revolution.

Similarly they supposed that wealth distribution was not a major factor, presenting as evidence that while Columbia suffered for that cause, Brazil "got away" with it. I'd say if 50% of countries with a high inequality of wealth suffer civil wars, that would make it a pretty major factor. Further that, as I mentioned recently to Barry, the other South American countries, including Brazil, that haven't seen recent revolutions are not out of the woods yet. They are facing severe problems with their democratic governments as progressive leadership is elected by the masses and has to go head to head with a small, but incredibly powerful upper class that has heretofore dominated the political system. Argentina has been hovering on the brink of total collapse for some time now, Venzuela just recently stepped back from the edge of civil war, and Brazil is now facing their first such challenge by a progressive government to the entrenched power of the wealthy. The verdict is certainly not in as to whether these democracies will survive their disparities of wealth.

For this very reason, however, I do support the authors' contention that democracy holds no promise of political stability for developing nations. I have serious doubts as to how well democracy can survive in this nation as the disparity of wealth grows. In most developing nations the situation is much worse. I continue to believe that having a large and healthy middle class is a crucial element to a strong democracy. Additionally, it has long been my contention that there needs to be a high level of social and cultural buy-in for democracy to succeed. Democracy is a fragile form of government which offers opportunities for corruption and subversion at every turn. Most developing nations are just not there yet. And this is a major difference of opinion between myself and these authors who completely dismiss the role of culture and historical background in civil war.

But I also have some agreement with the conclusions of the article. One of the elements they stress is the role of international peacekeepers. This I could not agree with more. I think that more than anything we need to buy time for these nations and provide them with the stability they need to grow the cultural, economic and educational infrastructure they need to create a stable government. And to otherwise get out of their way and let them do it. Some lessons can only be learned by experience...

I keep coming back to Iran. I just wish we could have seen what would have happened to them had the whole axis of evil thing never occurred. They had just the incremental reforms and high expectations we've been talking about. They've completely rejected foreign influence for 20 years and at the same time toppled the old aristocracy, and have come around to democracy on their own terms. They have a strong sense of national identity, unity, and pride. And even the newly entrenched powers were recognizing the need to change and liberalise. These are precisely the conditions that I would view ideal for the creation of a healthy and stable democracy. I couldn't write a better script. Unfortunately, by continuously rattling our sabre at Iran and praising the reformers we are tainting them with the perception of being American agents. This in a country that topped out Foreign Policy's chart (same issue) of popular nationalism and that is rabidly anti-colonialist.

And what a powerful example they could have been to the developing world. To demonstrate that nationalism and indepence from the colonial powers, the liberal democracies, is not, in fact, incompatible with the development of one's own liberal democracy. The neo-cons have been hoping that in Iraq they could create a shining example democracy for the middle east. That could have been, should have been, Iran. How much more powerful a demonstration would it have been to show them that they could get where they need to go without having to capitulate to the hated imperialists...