A Gaffe That Draws Blood

I have to concede, I am really quite pleased that John McCain started running his mouth about the Anbar Awakening. Before he did, the Conventional Wisdom on the Surge was so firmly established as to appear immovable. Everybody knows, the Surge worked. The fact that there is very little evidence to support that assertion really never came up. And if anyone tried to bring it up, they were scoffed at (as Obama was in the USA Today editorial above). Now that McCain has brought to the fore the fact that the Anbar Awakening, one of the most critical elements of our recent success in Iraq, was unrelated to the Surge, we can start to revisit the Conventional Wisdom.

What I think we'll find is that the real root cause for the turnaround in violence in Iraq had less to do with the additional 20,000 troops than with a change in tactics of which the Anbar Awakening was one element. The dramatic rise of David Petraeus marked the military's final grudging acceptance of the need to engage in actual counterinsurgency operations. After several disastrous years fighting the insurgency, it dawned on the Pentagon that their only real successes came where officers like Petraeus and H.R. McMaster eschewed the major operations that were up to that point the mainstay of the Iraq occupation and adopted classic counterinsurgency tactics. Hell, Petraeus wrote the book on the topic. Petraeus's ascension and this shift in tactics is what made the Anbar Awakening and the later success of the Surge possible.

This is a fairly important distinction, for a couple of reasons. First, is its obvious political impact. McCain has staked much on the fact that he supported the Surge when few others did, and the apparent success of the Surge is supposed to justify any number of prior errors of judgment with respect to Iraq (note how the USA Today article asks Obama to admit he was wrong about the surge, but it doesn't ask McCain to admit he was wrong about invading). If the Surge was not the answer, what does McCain have left to hang his hat on? Even if McCain did back counterinsurgency tactics, and it's not clear he did, that wouldn't be a terribly unique position. This humble blogger criticized the major ops approach to fighting the insurgency as far back as 2003, called for the implementation of counterinsurgency tactics in early 2004, and praised the military's movement in that direction in late 2005. Where was McCain all that time? I could have used his help back then.

Aside from the 2008 election, this debate has other long-term implications. Crediting the Surge for all that has gone right serves the right-wing's ever-popular Green Lantern Theory of Foreign Policy. According to the Green Lantern Theory ("GLT") any military failure is caused by a lack of willpower, and any military objective is achievable given a sufficient reserve of willpower. A corollary to the GLT is that any domestic criticism of either the decision to engage in a military conflict or the conduct of such conflict is a direct attack on the one resource necessary to win such a conflict (willpower) and thereby equivalent to treason. Proponents of the GLT have long scorned concepts such as nationbuilding, the exercise military restraint, respect for local culture, winning of hearts and minds, and, indeed, just about every other element of a traditional counterinsurgency operation. Not only are such things considered to be pointless, but they might weaken our resolve and are therefore deemed harmful to the cause.

Pinning all success in Iraq to the Surge is a perfect narrative fit for the GLT. Just when everyone else wanted to discuss withdrawal, George W. Bush rode the rescue with bulging reserves of willpower and not only refused to withdraw, he upped the ante as a tangible demonstration of his generous endowment of resolve. And lo, victory was achieved. If this is the narrative that comes out of the Iraq war, we will all live to regret it. The United States and Iraq alike paid a painful and bloody price to learn the lessons that the GLT proponents hope to obscure in a haze of Surge-o-philia.

In truth what we learned this time around are a lot of the lessons we should have learned from Vietnam. Indeed, Robert McNamara basically did learn those lessons. It is no coincidence that so did David Petraeus and H.R. McMaster. Petraeus wrote a doctoral thesis at Princeton titled "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam." McMaster also wrote a doctoral thesis on the mistakes of the American military in Vietnam. The lessons were there to be learned, but few among conservative policymakers and the Pentagon brass did, enamored of the GLT as they are. Will we walk away from Iraq with the public and policymakers learning all the same wrong lessons so that the next time around we will, at terrible cost, have to rediscover the right ones all over again? I surely hope not. And I hope that McCain's gaffe will open the door to a more robust public dialogue on this topic.

Total War on Iraq

I was rather shocked today to find a column on CSM from a former managing editor arguing that the reason the US is struggling in Iraq (and didn't win in Korea and Vietnam) is our unwillingness to engage in total war. And what, exactly, does John Dillin mean by total war? The complete destruction of an enemy nation, including massive civilian casualties. As examples he cites the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Sherman ravaging the American South. There's certainly a compelling argument that such tactics should never be acceptable (particularly compelling with respect to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for which there is compelling evidence to suggest the bombings were completely unnecessary to prompt Japanese surrender and had far more to do with the Cold War than WWII). But even accepting the premise that such attacks can sometimes be permissible, there's a pretty major difference between those situations and Iraq: in each of those conflicts the US faced an active state opponent, with troops in the field and territory under its control.

The idea of waging such a war in Iraq is not only absurd, but morally reprehensible in the extreme. We don't face state opposition. The Iraq government is our putative ally. We control the entirety of Iraq. For us to target Iraqi population centers for indiscriminate bombing wouldn't be waging war, but rather an exercise in genocide. At least in WWII there was always a means for our opponents to end the slaughter: unconditional surrender. What would signal a stopping point in Iraq? The Iraqi state has already conceded. It would simply be a gratuitous massacre lasting until our bloodlust had been sated.

But would it work? Perhaps if we slaughtered millions of Iraqis the insurgents would throw in the towel (although a couple million dead Vietnamese argue to the contrary). But even if they did, and even if we weren't troubled by the morality of it, where would this leave us internationally? Could anyone ever again regard us as a force for good in the world? Would our standing in the conflict with Al Qaeda and political extremism be improved? It would be an umitigated disaster.

Dillin's argument strikes me as another reflection of the general frustration that our military opponents have evolved and adapted in the days since WWII. The tactics we used there cannot work anymore, and that's no accident. It is precisely because the US military is amazingly proficient at total war that no enemy will ever allow us to bring that proficiency to bear. They know that for all our might in defeating armies and conquering territory, when it comes to holding territory over the long term, we are merely human. They can concede the field then engage us in a knife fight. And in doing so they gain the added benefit of transforming a military conflict into a political one, happily revealing our serious deficiencies in that arena. Our enemies have learned from the wars of the last century and moved on. Maybe it's time we did the same.

And Here We Are Again...

So I was recently poking around wikipedia trying to find a quote from the documentary Fog of War, and, on the Fog of War wiki page, I came across a list of 11 lessons that appeared in Bob McNamara's book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. These lessons are different from the ones that appeared in the film (that list was actually developed by the filmmaker, Errol Morris, over McNamara's objection). Reading this list I was quite stunned at how accurately and completely they sum up our current disaster. It's eerie. Keep in mind that the book was written in 1996, seven years before we embarked on our Iraq adventure. Here they are:

1. We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.

2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.

4. Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.

5. We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine…

6. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.

7. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement … before we initiated the action.

8. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.

9. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.

10. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

11. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions … At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.

A Healthy Change for the Military

I've complained about this more than a few times, so I'd like to give some recognition where it's due. It seems the U.S. military has (somewhat belatedly) realized that peace-making and peace-keeping (that dreaded nation-building stuff) is an important part of their mission and something that they should train their soldiers to do. This may come too late for Iraq, but it's a step in the right direction.

Expert Opinions on Iraq

CSM has a bit on a Strategic Studies Institute report on the continuing occupation of Iraq. The authors doubt that the U.S. will be able to put down the insugency before leaving, or train Iraqi security forces sufficiently to do the job themselves. Moreover, they suggest that the U.S. start to consider that an undemocratic government may be necessary to create a stable Iraq. Additionally they argue that a timetable for withdrawal would not be helpful.

There is also a link to an NPR interview with a former director of the NSA, who argues that the best thing we can do for democracy in Iraq is leave now.

Bush: 'Bring It On' Not the Best Idea

A year and a half later, after challenging Iraqi resistance fighters to "bring it on", George Bush has admitted that he didn't really think that one through. I have to wonder whether this admission was at all impacted by this recently released English-language propaganda video, at the end of which the narrator taunts, "You have asked us to ‘Bring it on’, and so have we. Like never expected. Have you another challenge?” The video (transcript here) is really an impressive bit of work, both technically and in message. The music is a bit overblown, and the footage is at times quite distracting from the narration, but the footage itself is impressive and it's edited together well. The script, clearly tailored to a Western audience, paints the resistance as secular, confident, magnanimous, and multilateral. The source and authenticity of the video are unknown, but it has been widely circulated and reported.

Delaying the Elections

Former President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Adnan Pachachi has a column in the Washington Post urging that the Iraqi elections be delayed. Pachachi acknowledges that such a delay would be a victory for the insurgents, but feels that it is better for the nation's long term stability to let the insurgents win round one than to put in power a government who most Iraqis will consider illegitimate. I agree with his reasoning on this point, but underlying the decision to delay is an assumption that if the election is held later on security (and thereby voter turnout) will be better. I see nothing to justify that assumption, and, in fact, the insurgents may be emboldened by their success at having forced a delay in the first case.

The Insurgent and the Aid Worker

Slate is running a well-written piece by Owen West and Phillip Carter defending the actions of the now famous marine in Fallujah who executed an apparently defenseless insurgent. Their arguments are sound, and I agree with them that the case for charging and convicting this marine is far from clear. They move on from there to draw comparisons to brutal killing of Margaret Hassan. Again they reach some valid and important conclusions. Margaret Hassan was a noncombatant aid worker. The man shot by the marine appears to have been an insurgent combatant. The insurgents kill indiscriminately, the U.S. takes care to try and limit civilian deaths. The American soldiers are generally honorable. The insurgents are not.

These are good points. And yet I can't help but feel that something is lost in this discussion. The arguments advanced by Carter and West feel very familiar from the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinians go out and intentionally kill score of civilians. The Israeli military is only trying to engage militants, and if a few civilians are collaterally killed, well they tried their best to avoid it. But at the end of the day, everybody is just as dead as everybody else. And at the end of the day there are more than twice as many dead Palestinians (approximately half of them noncombatants) as there are Israelis, and orders of magnitude more dead Iraqis than Westerners. When some Israeli kid shoots somebody in self defense who turns out to be a noncombatant, surely his action is more morally defensible than the action of a Palestinian suicide bomber. But who sent a scared 18 year-old into a Palestinian neighborhood armed with the most powerful weaponry money can buy? Can Westerners disavow the impact of widespread slaughter of civilians with the defense that our military personnel try to conduct themselves honorably? Is there no moral culpability for manufacturing a situation where it is highly probable that innocent civilians will be gunned down? And isn't it a bit trite to hold comparisons of the honorable conduct of the world's mightiest military against the conduct of desperate rag-tag insurgents? Honor is a luxury afforded by superior firepower. Did we expect them to line up in formation like a Napoleonic army so that we can massacre them with a single daisy cutter? Of course they use stealth and blend in the population. Of course they like to attack soft targets. How could we have expected otherwise?

None of this is to attempt to draw a conclusion that the Iraqi insurgents are morally equivalent to the U.S. occupiers, or even to the Palestinian militants for that matter. Clearly no good would come of the Iraqi insurgents prevailing against the occupation. The U.S., however ham-handed the effort has been, is really trying to create a functional democracy and improve the lot of Iraqis. Ultimately (not passing judgment on the decision to invade in the first place), the U.S. has the right of this conflict. But that's not my point. The point is that it is foolish to view this conflict and actors in the conflict by falling back on these notions of honorable conduct to justify and defend U.S. actions and to prove our moral superiority. These terms miss the point of what is happening on the ground and wall-paper over decisions which predictably lead to the deaths of many innocent civilians. And it causes us to see events in a distinctly different light than they are seen by Iraqis and other arabs. They are painfully aware of what we are not: that we made the choice to put thousands of scared soldiers with itchy trigger fingers into the places where they live, where they work, where their children go to school. Until we can see things from this perspective we will be forever perplexed by how our actions are being interpreted by the Iraqi public.

This perspective sheer hurts us by leaving the U.S. unable to effectively communicate a meaningful response to Iraqis when an event occurs like the killing in Fallujah. The arguments advanced by West and Carter probably resonate strongly with Americans, but, I think, much less so with Iraqis. What they want to hear is that we understand what a burden it is for them to have all these troops wandering around blowing things up, the checkpoints, the nighttime raids, the airstrikes, the mass detentions. They want to know that we feel their pain and are doing everything in our power to put an end to the chaos, give them a functional country, and get the hell out. The point is not that the marine was probably justified in shooting the insurgent, the point is that it's regrettable that the marine had to be there in the first place.

The Need to Adapt

Returning again to The Atlantic Monthly, Rand Corporation analyst Bruce Hoffman has written an article on the need for the US intervention in Iraq to adapt to the realities of combatting an insurgency. The unwillingness to acknowledge that the old rules of conventional warfare do not apply against guerrilla insurgents has been a frequent criticism of mine, and Hoffman does an excellent job of assessing the situation, finding similarities and differences with past insurgencies and pointing out areas in which the US needs to make adjustments.

Thank God We Rescued the Iraqis...

...from Saddam's torture chambers. I mean, that way we can hook the electrodes to their testicles ourselves. Adnan Al-Pachachi comes to the US's defense, noting that while Saddam tortured and killed his prisoners, the US only tortures the prisoners, but doesn't kill them. Of course, judging by Tuesday's Afghanistan article, it's only a matter of time before we start killing them too.

Alright, so clearly it's disingenuous to suggest that this is in any way US policy. However, I think it's entirely appropriate to suggest that the US government has completely failed in their task of preparing soldiers for the work required of them. Since the close of the Cold War the US army has been mostly used for interventions and peace-keeping operations. And the likelihood that we'll engage in a large-scale conventional war anytime in the next decade or so is exceedingly slim. Yet the military has stubbornly refused to accept that peacekeeping is an important duty that is required of them. Instead of preparing for it, they whine and moan each time that their soldiers are not prepared for this and don't know what to do, and, boy, what difficult and compromising position we're putting them in. Oh, poor me. The Bush administration came in with the same mind-set, and in 2002 they shut down the Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute (which, of course, only had a budget of $200k and a staff of 10 people anyway). So every time that the military screws up in Iraq and we hear the familiar refrain they were trying to perform a job they were never trained for, let's keep in mind that this is only the case because both civilian and military leadership refuse to admit the by-now obvious reality that peacekeeping is a vital part of the military's mission.

The Impact of Fallujah

While the fighting in Fallujah is not likely over, the effects of the battle are already being assessed. One of the goals for the US in Iraq was to create a sense of national unity between Sunnis and Shias. Well, mission accomplished. The two factions are now united in their desire to shed American blood. Moreover, CSM reports, that the strong US response in Fallujah has changed Iraqi perceptions of the US occupation, and not for the better. There is an eye-witness account of the fighting in Fallujah running on alternet.org, and while I'm not sure how far to trust its veracity (the writer tends to have a strongly leftist perspective), it presents a powerful explanation for the Iraqi reaction against US actions there. But then, even if this account is exaggerated against the US forces, is it likely to be any different than the manner in which these events will be reported on Al-Jazeera? As of now, the US effort to pacify Fallujah is the defining event of the occupation of Iraq, and I suspect it will be some months before we fully realize the impact that it has had. If the coalition does not come up with some effective damage control for this situation it will be to our everlasting regret.

Going To Hell In A Handbasket

It's been a tough couple weeks for the coalition in Iraq. Today saw protests, riots, and gun battles across Baghdad, Ramadi, Falluja, Najaf, al-Shuala, Nasiriya, and Basra. Most of the recent trouble is coming from Shia groups who previously had not given the coalition much difficulty. Now Al-Qaeda has released a tape in which they threaten to assassinate US leaders in Iraq. Meanwhile Donald (the other "the Donald") Rumsfeld says that things are under control and we don't need more troops in Iraq. Maybe he's not reading the same news I'm reading...

Who is this Muqtada al-Sadr fella?

It seems the Bush administration is asking itself that very question right now. On Monday, the Bush administration declared that Sadr is an "outlaw" and announced that it now plans to arrest Sadr [WP] on a warrant it has been sitting on since last fall for allegedly conspiring to assassinate a rival Shiite cleric in April 2003. On Saturday, Coalition forces arrested one of Sadr's top aides, Mustafa Yaqoubi, in connection with the same crime. That arrest--in conjunction with the Coalition's decision to shut down Sadr's newspaper [BBC]--precipitated this weekend's violence, which some say is the worst Iraq has seen after Saddam's fall.

Asia Times reported over two weeks ago that Sadr had been warning armed resistence would soon begin. CBS News interviewed Sadr in October (here's the transcript), and they reported back then that Sadr was suspected of being a chief instigator in much of the violent resistence.

The BBC reports that Sadr has a relatively small following among Shiite Muslims in Iraq (ABC News agrees), but that of course may change depending on the Coalition response to the recent uprising. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has apparently been trying to broker peace [Reuters], but Sadr has apparently rejected Sistani's plea, and has chosen instead to continue his campaign of armed resistance. He is currently holed up in one of Iraq's holiest shrines.

The Council on Foreign Relations provides an excellent background on Sadr (his dad, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, was the most powerful Shiite cleric in Iraq until Saddam executed him in the late 90's) and describes the events leading up to the recent Shiite unrest. Keep in mind that these events must be viewed as distinct from the goings-on in Sunni-controlled Fallujah, although one can imagine both groups are seeking to take advantage of the overall instability in Iraq.

We now find ourselves in the most delicate position we have been in since invading Iraq, and I fear that the Bush administration is not capable of handling the situation properly. Pulling out now would only create an ideal environment to cultivate terrorists and the ideology that drives them (although the support for keeping the troops in Iraq is definitely waning [Pew]). The best game plan I can think of is to throw support behind Sistani, who seems genuinely interested in promoting the peace (although that is highly unlikely, because Sistani has been very critical of the Coalition's plans for transitioning out of Iraq [FT]) and encourage a more active involvement by the UN. Moreover, it seems utterly ridiculous that Bush insists on sticking with the original June 30 transition date [Reuters], particularly when Senators in the President's own party are calling for more troops to stabilize the situation.

Combatting Insurgencies

At least some of our military people are ready to take a long look at the unconventional tactics used by our enemies in Iraq and elsewhere. From day one of the terror conflict, the administration and their political allies have heavily promoted a sentiment that making an effort to understand the motives and tactics of our opponents is somehow akin to admitting defeat or appeasing the enemy. I see it as an absolute necessity if any positive results are to come of our efforts.

The Long, Slow Slide

News from Iraq gets uglier and uglier. I think we are at the brink of a point of no return, after which point it will be impossible to repair our relationship with the Iraqi people and we will be powerless to help their new government succeed. We'll be left with no option but to pack up and go home and hope for the best. Or we may have already stepped off that precipice and started the long slide down, it's hard to say... And if we have gone over the edge, if past history is a guide, it may take us years to realize it..

CSM has a great roundup of coverage on the newly infamous battle at Samarra. To cover some highlights:

A supposed US officer who fought in the battle wrote to an ex-military blogger:
"During the ambushes the tanks, brads and armored HUMVEES hosed down houses, buildings, and cars while using reflexive fire against the attackers. One of the precepts of "Iron Hammer" is to use an Iron Fist when dealing with the insurgents. As the division spokesman is telling the press, we are responding with overwhelming firepower and are taking the fight to the enemy. The response to these well coordinated ambushes was as a one would expect. The convoy continued to move, shooting at ANY target that appeared to be a threat. RPG fire from a house, the tank destroys the house with main gun fire and hoses the area down with 7.62 and 50cal MG fire. Rifle fire from an alley, the brads fire up the alley and fire up the surrounding buildings with 7.62mm and 25mm HE rounds. This was actually a rolling firefight through the entire town."

With typical understatement, the BBC wrote:
"The Americans were using enormously powerful weapons, including 50 mm cannons mounted on Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and 120 mm tank rounds from the Abrams. Used in a densely populated urban area, built with flimsy mud-bricks, it is almost inconceivable that people well out of sight of the gunners were not also injured in the battle. "

The US military take:
"We have been very aggressive in our convoy operations to ensure the maximum force protection is with each convoy, but it does send a clear message that if you attempt to attack one of our convoys, we're going to use our firepower to stop that attack."

Response of a Samarran emergency room worker:
"All the people in town today are asking for revenge. They want to kill the Americans like they killed our civilians. Give me a gun, and I will also fight."

Conclusion of our anonymous US combatant:
"Since we did not stick around to find out, I am very concerned in the coming days we will find we killed many civilians as well as Iraqi irregular fighters. I would feel great if all the people we killed were all enemy guerrillas, but I can't say that. We are probably turning many Iraqi against us and I am afraid instead of climbing out of the hole, we are digging ourselves in deeper."

How Not To Stage an Occupation

CSM has an interesting article where they discuss Iraq with former Soviet personnel involved with their invasion of Afghanistan. Some of it is obvious, other parts very insightful.

Shooting In the Dark

The latest word from Iraq is that we're going on the offensive to destroy the resistance. We seem to have some remarkably thick skulls in Washington. We apparently haven't come up with a single new strategy for dealing with guerrilla attacks since Vietnam. We thought in that case that if we applied enough excessive force the enemy would have to cave eventually. However, we couldn't effectively separate the enemy from the populace, and the amount of 'collateral damage' we inflicted on them turned the war decisively in favor of the enemy. Our experience in Somalia was not terribly different either. We responded to a few guerrilla attacks with invasive offensive operations, but had a hard time targeting the right people, killed a bunch of the wrong people by mistake, and were then sent out the back door with a boot print on our ass. Now it looks like we intend to step in it again. Clearly, if we had good intelligence we would have nailed the bad guys before this. So if we're going on the attack it can easily be deduced that we are going to be striking out based on bad intelligence and we will most certainly make mistakes and kill innocents, possibly as many as we kill bad guys.

The deal is, given modern political realities (ie. genocide is a definite no-no), guerrilla wars are phenomenally difficult to win. Your opponents can effectively conceal themselves at all times except when they attack, while you are separated and visible, and at all times vulnerable to attack. Your enemy gets to choose the time and location for every battle, which gives them a decisive tactical advantage. In the old days this would be countered by wholesale destruction. The superior army would rape, pillage, and slaughter their way through the enemy populace until they submitted or were destroyed. This is not generally considered acceptable these days. The only effective counter then, appears to be to build up enough public support that the locals isolate the militants from themselves and leave them exposed to you. However, this means that you cannot strike out blindly and must patiently accept casualties while continuing to be engaged and friendly with the local population in order to build goodwill. Given the realities of morale and the human limits of your troops on the ground who don't like to be engaged and friendly while they're being shot at and killed, this is not often possible. No matter your military superiority, it is not always possible to defeat a determined guerrilla campaign. I can't think of a single case where a modern military has done so.

So the first rule to winning a guerrilla war is not to get into one. It cannot be stressed often or strongly enough, that we could very likely have avoided this if we had built a broad UN-based coalition the same way Bush Sr had for the first Gulf War. If anything good comes out of this, hopefully it will be the realization that the politics of the situation are at least as important as the military aspects of it. Winning on the battlefield is of no benefit if you don't also win in the living room. This may be the biggest flaw in the neo-con political theory. The value of military might ain't what it used to be. This is the dirty secret hidden behind the Powell Doctrine and the Rumsfeld Doctrine, and all of the other post-Vietnam military theories. Any pissant little country can send us home with our tail between our legs if they're stubborn enough.

The bad guys are starting to think they can win, and it's not hard to see why. They're building up momentum and we're standing there like a deer in head-lights wishing we could figure a way out. Unless we can think of some creative solution, and quickly, it may not be long before Iraq passes the point of no return.

Ritter: Iraq Planned For This

It was interesting to see Scott Ritter appear as a CSM opinion columnist today. He wrote a feature on the nature and preparations of the Iraqi resistance campaign based on his observations as a weapons inspector. It is the first I've seen or heard of him since the right wing launched a massive and vicious smear campaign against him before the war. Funny what being right when everyone else (even most of the anti-war crowd) thought you were wrong can do for a person's image.

Commentary: Did Someone Say Quagmire?

There's another story today about a couple more US soldiers killed in Iraq. If this keeps up I may have to retract my predictions of a W second term. I always figured Iraq would eventually descend into chaos, given the general success of Western nations in building democracy in developing nations. But I was sort of expecting that the administration could pull the same sort of snow job with Iraq that they did with Afghanistan. But as long as there are reports of dead GI's in the news every night Bush is not going to get far pretending the nation building mission has been a smashing success. And if the war goes south, he isn't left with much to hang his hat on. Of course, I still tend to think he'll skate on the WMD issue..

Article: Guerrilla Warfare is the Life For Me

Posted on the CS Monitor today is this article, welcoming back our friends the Taliban. I had to laugh a bit at the part where Salam mentions that Russia supplies them with weapons and money. Highly unlikely, but an amusing thought nonetheless. I don't doubt there are people in the Russian military who'd like to.