Saddam and Osama Sitting In a Tree...

Talking Points Memo has this entry regarding all the recent hub-bub over the Iraq-al Qaeda link.

The 9-11 Commission recently released a staff statement (entitled "Overview of the Enemy" [PDF]--isn't that catchy?) that started all this talk anew when they had this to say:

Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime. Bin Ladin had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Hussein Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded Bin Ladin to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda have also occurred after Bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collabiorative relationship. Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamently denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.

Somehow the Bush administration took from that report the idea that "9-11 Commission Staff Report Confirms Administration's Views of al-Qaeda/Iraq Ties," according to a Talking Points email that the administration sent out to its supporters (as reported in this WP article). And Vice President Cheney recently confirmed that Saddam "had long established ties with al Qaeda" [Remarks available on Whitehouse.gov].]

One last thing--Stephen Hayes (of Weekly Standard fame) wrote a book called The Connection that highlighted all the purportedly strong evidence for the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, but most of it does not hold much water (if Hayes' article of the same name is at all similar to the book). The one claim worth looking into (and highlighted recently by 9-11 Commissioner John Lehman on Meet the Press) is that a dude named Ahmed Hikmat Shakir was revealed on a roster of Saddam's (as a liuetenant colonel) and a dude by the same name also participated in meetings with sketchy folks in Malaysia in 2000. But I fail to see hwo that constitutes "long established ties." I guess I'm just dense (but then so is this CSMonitor commentator).

For other quotes by the Bush administration, see this New Republic Online post.

Update: Newsday is reporting that the CIA concluded ("a long time ago") that the Shakir fella who showed up on Saddam's list is not the al Qaeda terrorist by the same name. LAT is also reporting that "a U.S. intelligence official" is disputing the connection: Apparently a CIA investigation earlier this year "concluded that the individuals listed in captured Iraqi documents as members of the Fadayeen are not the same as the Iraqi who facilitated the arrival of a September 11 hijacker in Kuala Lumpur." So apparently he's an Iraqi--just not the Iraqi they thought he was? The WP claims that "a senior administration official" explained the name mix-up: the al Qaeda guy is "Ahmad Hikmat Shakir Azzawi" and the Iraqi military guy is Lt. Col. "Hakmit Shakir Ahmad." Sorry Iraq--it was just a simple misunderstanding. Here's your country back, just as we found it.

Should Bush Find a Permanent CIA Director Before November?

The NYT writes that the Bush administration is actively pondering that question right now (I know what you're thinking. I didn't think that the Bush administration could actively ponder either. But I guess we were wrong.)

Oh where is David when you need him for his witty and pragmatic political analysis?

On a (somewhat) related note and discussed in that same NYT story (and also at this CSM story), a new book is about to be released by a "senior intelligence official" that was apparently vetted by the CIA. Who is this mystery author?

Bush and McCain Play Nice

Hopefully this story [WP] will put to bed those nagging rumors about McCain serving as Kerry's running mate.

WP Story on Negroponte

Well, it's good to see that not everyone in the mainstream media has forgotten that June 30 ain't too far off. Good coverage on the man taking over the mess (see this earlier BWJ entry on Negroponte). Well, apparently not the whole mess--according to this National Security Presidential Directive obtained by Steve Aftergood at the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. Military retains authority over security and military operations:

When the CPA is terminated, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission, who on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, and employees seconded to an International Organization.

Commander, USCENTCOM, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. In all activities, the Chief of Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM, shall ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support.

The Presidential Directive also provides that the Secretary of Defense gets to choose the Director for a new temporary office called the "Project and Accounting Office," whose services include "engineering, auditing, and other contract-related services."

And of course, our role is limited anyway seeing that Iraq will get "full sovereignty" on June 30. (I'll believe it when I see it).

Thanks to Talking Points Memo for pointing me to the Presidential Directive.

Getting His 80th Birthday Kicks

NYT ran this story on #41. I can't help but wonder whether it can be seen as a symbollic gesture that President Bush Sr. suddenly feels the need to practice his parachuting skills.

A Novel Approach to Foreign Policy: Help Weak States Before They Devolve To Chaos

CSM ran this article today about a report (full report available here; executive summary here) released by the bipartisan Commission on Weak States and US National Security. The executive summary made many interesting points, and so I am tempted to read the whole thing. Anyone else interested in making this a focus point for discussion?

And Sanchez is the Winner! (or the Loser, All Depending How You Look At It)

The WP opens this story with the following:

Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior U.S. military officer in Iraq, borrowed heavily from a list of high-pressure interrogation tactics used at the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and approved letting senior officials at a Baghdad jail use military dogs, temperature extremes, reversed sleep patterns, sensory deprivation, and diets of bread and water on detainees whenever they wished, according to newly obtained documents.

I'm sure that the Pentagon's decision to "rotate out" General Sanchez (LAT) had nothing to do with this. President Bush: Sanchez "has done a fabulous job. He's been there for a long time. His service has been exemplary."

A "Senior Defense Official" said "He's been there going on 14 months now. Anybody trying to draw a line between the natural progression of looking for somebody to rotate into that position to the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib would be just wrong. There's absolutely no connection whatever."

From the LAT story: "It was unknown what Sanchez's next assignment would be."

Sanchez or Pappas or Miller in the Doghouse?

From the Senate Hearing on May 19:
REED: General Sanchez, today's USA Today, sir, reported that you ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation, intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise and inducing fear as an interrogation method for a prisoner in Abu Ghraib prison. Is that correct?

SANCHEZ: Sir, that may be correct that it's in a news article, but I never approved any of those measures to be used within CJTF-7 at any time in the last year.

REED: Excuse me. Because I want to get back to this. It may be correct that you ordered those methods used against a prisoner. Is that your answer?

SANCHEZ: No, sir, that's not what I said. I said it may be correct...

REED: Well, I didn't hear; that's why I want...

SANCHEZ: ... that it's printed in an article, but I have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in the 12.5 months that I've been in Iraq.

From Today's Washington Post:
Sgts. Michael J. Smith and Santos A. Cardona, Army dog handlers assigned to Abu Ghraib, told investigators that military intelligence personnel requested that they bring their dogs to prison interrogation sites multiple times to assist in questioning detainees in December and January. Col. Thomas M. Pappas, who was in charge of military intelligence at the prison, told both soldiers that the use of dogs in interrogations had been approved, according to the statements.

"I have talked to Col. Papus [sic] and he said it was good to go," Smith told an investigator on Jan. 23.

* * *

In Army memos regarding interrogation techniques at the prison, the use of military working dogs was specifically allowed -- as long as higher-ranking officers approved the measures. According to one military intelligence memo obtained by The Post, the officer in charge of the military intelligence-run interrogation center at the prison had to approve the use of dogs in interrogations. There is no explanation in the memo of what parameters would have to be in place -- for example, whether the dogs would be muzzled or unmuzzled -- or what the dogs would be allowed to do. The Army previously has said that the commanding general of U.S. troops in Iraq -- Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez -- would have had to approve the use of dogs.

This all comes out immediately after Lt. Gen. Sanchez asked that a higher-ranking official take over the investigation so that he could be questioned about his role in the prison abuse (see this CNN article)

In an earlier story, the WP quotes Col. Pappas as saying that Gen. Miller did in fact approve the use of dogs (from Taguba's report--apparently Pappas's statement is in the 2,000 pages that the Pentagon failed to deliver to Congress (see this NYT story)--although this Reuters story claims the Army now certifies that the Senate now has a "true and accurate copy of the report")
"It was a technique I had personally discussed with General Miller, when he was here" visiting the prison, testified Pappas, head of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the officer placed in charge of the cellblocks at Abu Ghraib prison where abuses occurred in the wake of Miller's visit to Baghdad between Aug. 30 and Sept. 9, 2003.

"He said that they used military working dogs at Gitmo [the nickname for Guantanamo Bay], and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which, you know, you could get information" from the prisoners, Pappas told the Army investigator, Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, according to a transcript provided to The Washington Post.

* * *

After calling the use of dogs Miller's idea, Pappas explained that "in the execution of interrogation, and the interrogation business in general, we are trying to get info from these people. We have to act in an environment not to permanently damage them, or psychologically abuse them, but we have to assert control and get detainees into a position where they're willing to talk to us."

Pappas added that it "would never be my intent that the dog be allowed to bite or in any way touch a detainee or anybody else." He said he recalled speaking to one dog handler and telling him "they could be used in interrogations" anytime according to terms spelled out in a Sept. 14, 2003, memo signed by Sanchez.

That memo included the use of dogs among techniques that did not require special approval. The policy was changed on Oct. 12 to require Sanchez's approval on a case-by-case basis for certain techniques, including having "military working dogs" present during interrogations.

Wait--There's More Bad Apples

The San Diego Union-Tribune reports here:

While world attention was focused on the scandal at Abu Ghraib prison, two Marines were court-martialed May 14 for abusing an Iraqi prisoner with electricity, it was disclosed yesterday.

Five more Marines have been implicated in the same early April incident at a Marine-run detention facility and might face charges, according to Marine officials in Iraq.

Andrew J. Sting and Jeremiah J. Trefney, both 19 and privates first class assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment at Camp Lejeune, N.C., pleaded guilty to charges that included cruelty and maltreatment for shocking an unruly prisoner, according to a Marine statement in response to questions from The San Diego Union-Tribune.

The East Coast-based infantry battalion is attached to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which has headquarters in San Diego.

The prisoner had been detained at Al Mahmudiya prison.

Sting was sentenced to a year in jail and Trefney received eight months. Both were reduced in rank, will forfeit all pay and will leave the military with a bad conduct discharge.

Notice that the last two reports are NOT from Abu Ghraib.

A Few More Bad Apples

The LATimes reports here:

A military investigator has concluded that low-ranking Marines repeatedly struck two defenseless Iraqis at a makeshift prison camp last June, and one of the detainees died after he was left disabled and naked under a scorching sun.

In two reports obtained by The Times, Marine Col. William V. Gallo also criticized an investigation into the death, saying the deceased Iraqi's bodily fluids were mishandled by investigators and were destroyed on the way to a laboratory for analysis.

* * *

Although Gallo found no evidence of the type of abuse or sexual humiliation depicted in photographs from Abu Ghraib, he did report that testimony showed that the Marine guards at Camp Whitehorse used a stressing technique known as 50/10, in which detainees were required to stand for 50 minutes out of every hour. The tactic was used until the arrival of trained interrogators — members of a "Human Intelligence Exploitation Team" — sometimes as long as eight hours later.

Several guards testified at hearings late last year and early this year that they were directed by the interrogators to use the technique "as a means to soften up a detainee before the initial interview occurred," Gallo wrote. Two military intelligence interrogators denied this in testimony at the same hearings, the military equivalent of a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. But Gallo concluded in his reports that someone from the intelligence unit "must have directed or strongly suggested" that guards use the tactic.

The Actions of a Few

I have been thinking some about the Bush administration's response that the whole Abu Ghraib affair should be brushed aside and focus placed on more pressing issues because it is simply "the actions of a few" and does not represent "the true nature and heart of America" according to Bush in his apology to Jordan's King Abdullah [AP](I never did figure out why Bush apologized to Jordan for the prison abuses). And it finally struck me that we are asking the Arab world to measure us not by the actions of those few derelict soldiers (assuming that is an accurate assessment of the situation), but rather by the conduct of all Americans. However, when it comes to the Global War on Terror, the Bush administration and many who support the war continue to condemn and oppress the Arab world based on the actions of a few.

For example, Senator Inhofe expressed "outrage at the outrage" at the Senate Hearing on May 11 (NYT) because the prisoners we are so concerned about are all (in Inhofe's mind) murderers, insurgents, and terrorists. And almost to prove his point, "those people" decapitated Nicholas Berg--one of "us"--that same day.

Contrary to Senator Inhofe's suggestions, the ICRC claims that most of the Abu Ghraib prisoners (up to 90%) are innocent. At the very least, we know that Abu Ghraib prisoners were not "high value"--the "high value" campers got extra-special treatment at a separate facility near the Baghdad Airport (that is now being investigated too [MSNBC]).

My point is that many of the problems that we face now and will continue to face in battling this Global War on Terror stems from separating "us" from "them," and holding "us" to a different standard than "them." How many Fallujans did we kill to avenge the deaths of four civilian contractors? Were they all murderers, insurgents, and terrorists too? Until we are willing to extend the same basic liberties that we consider inalienable for ourselves to all those who share this planet, there will be terrorism. Until we are willing to accept that the actions of a few others do not justify waging war on all others, we cannot hope to persuade the world that the actions of a few of "us" should not reflect poorly upon America.

You Call Yourself a Patriot and a Republican?

From this article in today's NYT:

Today, Speaker J. Dennis Hastert was asked about Mr. McCain's view that Congress should not enact tax cuts during wartime because it keeps the public from developing the sense of shared sacrifice that war requires. Mr. Hastert, who was discussing tax cuts, the Republican budget and $50 billion for the war in Iraq, had had enough.

"Who?" asked Mr. Hastert as he heard Mr. McCain's name. "Where is he from? Is he a Republican?"

Then Mr. Hastert really unloaded on Mr. McCain, who sustained lifelong injuries as a prisoner of war in Vietnam.

"John McCain ought to visit our young men and women at Walter Reed and Bethesda," Mr. Hastert said. "There is the sacrifice in this country. We are trying to make sure they have the ability to fight this war, that they have the wherewithal to do it. At the same time we have to react to keep this country strong not only militarily, but economically. We have to have the flexibility to do it. That is my answer to John McCain."

According to Noted Now [ABCNews], McCain responded thusly:

"I fondly remember a time when real Republicans stood for fiscal responsibility. Apparently those days are long gone for some in our party."

Could It Be?

President Bush has scheduled a press conference at 11:30 ET at the Pentagon...

Update: That press conference was worthless. And my prediction was wrong. I am constantly amazed at the depth of this administration's denial. But I am even more amazed that the people have lost all affect. Rape? Torture? Those are just things that happen during wartime, and anyone who thinks otherwise is hopelessly naive. International disgrace? Who cares, so long as things look good at home. Lies? Everyone's a liar. And anyone accusing this administration of doing bad things is obviously making those accusations for political purposes.

No, the Bush administration isn't giving Rumsfeld walking papers. They are giving him accolades. President Bush (according to the AP): Secretary Rumsfeld "is doing a superb job"--he's a strong secretary and the nation owes him a debt of gratitude. Vice President Cheney (according to Reuters): He's the best Secretary of Defense the United States has ever had. People ought to get off Rumsfeld's case and let him do his job.

God bless America.

Questioning Prisoners of War

Both the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the U.S. Law of Land Warfare have this to say about the questioning of prisoners of war:

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.

Section VI, which discusses quarters, food, and clothing, states that POWs "shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health."

I leave it to you to decide whether the Pentagon's approved tactics of "sensory assault" (as described in this WP story) constitute exposure "to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind," and whether the conditions in Abu Ghraib were the same as those provided to U.S. troops in Baghdad.

The Taguba Report and "National Security"

My second concern regarding Rumsfeld's testimony is his explanation about how the investigation of prisoner abuse was handled within the military. As Rumsfeld repeatedly emphasized, the military began an investigation in January, and we now know that Major General Taguba released his report in February. It was classified. Why? When that question was posed to Rumsfeld in a press conference on May 4th, this is what he and General Pace had to say:

Q: General, a quick follow-up on that, please. Could you explain to us why the Taguba report was classified secret, no foreign distribution? Those of us who have read the report, there's clearly nothing in there that's inherently secret, such as intelligence sources and methods or troop movements. Was this kept secret because it would be embarrassing to the world, particularly the Arab world?

GEN. PACE: First of all, I do not know specifically why it was labeled secret. Potentially there are parts of the hundreds and hundreds of pages of documentation that are classified. I do not know that to be a fact, but normally we will classify a document at the highest level of anything that's in that document.

But as the secretary pointed out, immediately we told the world that we thought we had a problem. So there has been no attempt to hide this. What we've been trying to do is find out the truth of the matter so we can get on about correcting; finding out who did what, and then taking a proper action.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you say why it was classified secret? Do you know?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, you'd have to ask the classifier.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Q: Mr. Secretary? Taking into account –

SEC. RUMSFELD: You can ask General Casey, who's going to be down here discussing that later.

I don't know whether General Casey indeed discussed that later. As far as I have been able to find, there has been no explanation for why the Taguba report was classified.

On March 25, 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order 13292 that sets forth the policies and procedures for classifying information. It provides (in section 1.1) that "information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met:"

(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
(4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.

The DOD is considered an "original classification authority," so requirement #1 is met. The report was produced by the US Government, so #2 is ok. What about #3? The categories of information that can be classified according to section 1.4 are as follows:

(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction.

For the life of me, I cannot see how the Taguba report fits within any of those categories. And more importantly, section 1.7(a)(1) provides: "In no case shall information be classified in order to:
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error."

I am disappointed that no member of Congress asked Rumsfeld about this (as far as I know). There has also been very little press coverage. The Federation of American Scientists issued a press release stating "Torture Report May Have Broken Classification Rules," and according to this WP article the group sent a letter to J. William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office (the office responsible for overseeing classified material), seeking an explanation. CNet's News.com also published a story on this, and Friday's Democracy Now broadcast also mentioned the issue. But this certainly deserves more coverage, and a better explanation from the government.

Command Influence

There are two lingering concerns that I have after Secretary Rumsfeld's testimony in front of Congress. First, Rumsfeld suggested that the "command influence" doctrine somehow prevented him and other high-level DOD officials from learning too much about the claims of torture because their knowledge could somehow influence military prosecutions. That is a preposterous interpretation of the command influence doctrine. The Judge Advocate General School for the Air Force has published an instruction book entitled The Military Commmander and the Law that it uses to instruct commanders on the law and "it also serves as a handy reference guide for commanders in the field, providing general guidance and helping commanders to clarify issues and identify potential problem areas." That publication has a section dedicated to "Unlawful Command Influence." It explains what the doctrine prohibits:

A superior commander must not direct a subordinate commander to impose a particular punishment or take a particular action. To do so would constitute unlawful command influence because the decision was not that of the commander taking action or imposing punishment, but rather that of the superior commander.

The key consideration is whether a commander is taking disciplinary action based upon that commander?s own personal belief that the disciplinary action is appropriate or whether the commander is merely acquiescing to direction from a superior to impose the particular discipline.

It also explains what the doctrine does not prohibit:

Superior commanders are not prohibited from establishing and communicating policies necessary to maintenance of good order and discipline. They are also free to pass on their experience and advise subordinate commanders regarding disciplinary matters. Having done so, however, the superior commander must then step back and allow the subordinates to exercise their discretion in the matter.

It is simply ridiculous to assert that the command influence doctrine prohibits Secretary Rumsfeld or General Myers (or any other commander below them) from obtaining information regarding the conduct of its troops, particularly where that information is necessary to evaluate whether troop conduct complies with the obligations imposed by the Geneva Convention. Rumsfeld and others in the chain of command should not make statements that subordinates could interpret as suggesting how a prosecution should be resolved, but of course that does not restrict the flow of information in any way. Along those lines, as the Baltimore Sun explains in this article, Rumsfeld and Bush should be more cautious when making statements like "the wrongdoers will be brought to justice" and labeling the soldiers' behavior as "un-American." But the command influence doctrine simply does not encourage a commander to stick his head in the sand and ignore reports that detail unlawful troop conduct.

Rumsfeld's Senate Performance

The Washington Post has the transcript of Donald Rumsfeld's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee today. Pretty entertaining. John McCain's session was by far the best. Here's an excerpt:

MCCAIN: Thank you.

I'd like to know who was in charge of the -- what agencies or private contractors were in charge of interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were their instructions to the guards?

RUMSFELD: First, with respect to the...

SMITH: We did not bring it.

RUMSFELD: Oh, my.

SMITH: Yes, oh, my is right.

RUMSFELD: It was all prepared.

SMITH: Yes, it was, indeed.

RUMSFELD: Do you want to walk through it?

MCCAIN: Anyway, who was in charge? What agency or private contractor was in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions that they gave to the guards?

SMITH: I'll walk through the chain of command and...

MCCAIN: No. Let's just -- you can submit the chain of command, please.

WARNER: General Smith, do you want to respond?

MCCAIN: No. Secretary Rumsfeld, in all due respect, you've got to answer this question. And it could be satisfied with a phone call. This is a pretty simple, straightforward question: Who was in charge of the interrogations? What agencies or private contractors were in charge of the interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? And what were the instructions to the guards?

This goes to the heart of this matter.

RUMSFELD: It does indeed.

Re: Rummy's Rules

I've seen that before, and I'm pretty sure it's authentic. Although this one seems to be missing:

-When the weapons of mass destruction that you bet the farm on don't turn up, torture the prisoners for more information.

Rummy's Rules

I don't know if this is for real, but all the better if it is (from a Daily KOS discussion).

Talking Points Memo points out that the full PDF version may be found here.

My Prediction

Either Rumsfeld or Myers will be looking for a new job by the time the weekend is over.